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ARTICLE
LENDER DISCRIMINATION, BLACK
CHURCHES, AND BANKRUPTCY
Pamela Foohey*
ABSTRACT
Based on my original empirical research, in this Article I expose
a disparity between the demographics of the roughly 650 religious
congregations that have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy during part
of the last decade and congregations nationwide. Churches with
predominately Black membership-Black Churches-appeared in
Chapter 11 more than three times as often as they appear among
churches across the country. A conservative estimate of the
percentage of Black Churches among religious congregation Chapter
11 debtors is 60%. The likely percentage is upward of 75%. Black
Churches account for 21% of congregations nationwide.
Why are Black Churches filing under Chapter 11 more so than
other churches? Reorganization allows businesses to restructure
their debts. However, creditors may consensually agree to debt
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modifications, obviating the need for the expensive and
time-consuming reorganization process. Combining insights from my
interviews with seventy-six bankruptcy attorneys who represented
religious organizations and forty-five leaders of religious
organization debtors, with studies detailing discrimination against
Blacks in financial transactions, the Article posits one reason:
Lenders may have charged Black Churches more for credit and
denied Black Churches' loan modification requests, leading these
churches to file Chapter 11 to achieve restructurings.
In support of this explanation, the Article raises and rejects
other reasons as fully explanatory of the disparity: denomination,
location, financial resources, and the churches' internal
governance, financial decisions, and views about bankruptcy. It
also analyzes legal actions that may provide more evidence of
whether Black Churches' bankruptcy filings stem from lenders'
conduct, and if so, redress for the discriminatory practices. The
Article ends by discussing the disparity's implications for
bankruptcy and communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Based on my original empirical research, this Article exposes
that Black Churches-churches with predominately Black
membership'-are over-represented in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Relying on my original quantitative dataset of approximately 650
religious congregations that filed Chapter 11 from 2006 to 2013, I
find that at least 60% of the congregations were Black Churches. 2
This is a conservative estimate. Based on my interviews with
bankruptcy attorneys who represented a sizable portion of the
religious organizations, upward of 75% of the debtors likely were
Black Churches. 3 Nationwide, 21% of congregations have
predominately Black membership. 4
Black Churches thus are fifteen times more likely to seek to
reorganize than expected if congregations' racial demographics was
uncorrelated with bankruptcy.5 Exposing this disparity alone is
1. See C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1 (1990) (defining "Black Church").
2. Congregations are the subset of religious organizations that operate places of
worship. I define "religious organization" as any organization whose operations are
motivated in a meaningful way by faith-based beliefs and principles. See infra Part II.A for
a discussion of my dataset and how I identified demographics.
3. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of these interviews.
4. Continuity and Change in American Congregations, NAT'L CONGREGATIONS STUDY
44 (2012), http://www.soc.duke.edulnatcong/Docs/NCSIIreportfinaltables.pdf [https://
perma.ce/56CF-DJCN] (reporting congregations with at least 80% Black membership).
5. Assuming that Black Churches comprise 75% of religious congregation Chapter 11
2017] 1081
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critical to understanding who uses Chapter 11 and how different
subsets of the American population are affected by the bankruptcy
system. But the disparity begs the question, why are Black Churches
in particular filing Chapter 11?
Reorganization provides a mechanism for businesses to
restructure their debts. Most of the churches that filed did so in
order to modify the mortgages on their church buildings after they
had fallen behind on payments and after their lenders threatened
foreclosure. 6 Alternatively, creditors and debtors may come to
consensual deals that modify debts, obviating the need for the
expensive and time-consuming reorganization process. The
average bankruptcy attorney retainer in religious organization
Chapter 11 cases was over $10,000.7 Leaders also had to spend
countless hours managing the technical aspects of the cases, while
combatting the negative psychological effects, felt both by
themselves and their members, of their churches' filings.8 Of
course, the churches that filed Chapter 11 alternatively could have
closed.9 Nonetheless, Black Churches in particular elected to pay
to reorganize.
My qualitative interviews with 76 bankruptcy attorneys who
represented 109 religious organization debtors, and 45 leaders who
placed their religious organizations into Chapter 11 suggest one
potential explanation for why Black Churches are paying to
restructure their debts.' 0 Lenders may have sold Black Churches
filings, the Black Church to other congregation ratio is three to one. See infra Part II.B
(discussing demographics of congregations that filed under Chapter 11). Given that Black
Churches comprise 21% of congregations nationwide, the expected Black Church to other
congregation ratio is five to one, making Black Churches about fifteen times more likely to file
than predicted by chance. Continuity and Change in American Congregations, supra note 4, at
44.
6. Of the 530 debtors that cited a reason for their filing in any document submitted to
the court, 442 (83%) stated they filed to save their property from foreclosure. See Pamela
Foohey, Secured Credit in Religious Institutions' Reorganizations, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP
OPINIONS 51, 54 n.15, https://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Foohey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DK2-EJ8M] [hereinafter Foohey, Secured Credit].
7. See infra note 29.
8. See Pamela Foohey, When Faith Falls Short: Bankruptcy Decisions of Churches, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 1319, 1343 & n.139 (2015) [hereinafter Foohey, When Faith Falls Short].
9. Churches also could have liquidated under Chapter 7. Because liquidation yields the
same result as closing and dissolving under state law, if creditors are unwilling to negotiate, a
church's options effectively are to file Chapter 11 or close. A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters
in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1727-28 n.6 (2004) [hereinafter Dickerson, Race
Matters in Bankruptcy]. About 3,200 (1%) congregations close per year, though the reasons for
their closure are unknown. See Pamela Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, 78 MO. L. REV. 719,
733-34 (2013) [hereinafter Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith].
10. See Interview with Attorney 120, at 6 (Apr. 22, 2014); Interview with Attorney 5, at 4
(Mar. 2,2013); Interview with Attorney 106, at 3 (Apr. 14, 2014); infra Part II.B (discussing these
interviews).
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expensive loans, the equivalent of subprime home loans, to finance
their buildings." Likewise, whereas lenders negotiated with some
churches when they were unable to repay their loans, Black
Churches may have been "less forgiven" for their financial problems
and turned away when they requested modifications. 1 2 As a result,
Black Churches turned to Chapter 11 to achieve debt restructurings
more often than their incidence in the population of congregations
would predict.
Attorneys openly discussed what they perceived as lender bias
against Black Churches in loan origination and modification. They
described how lenders sold Black Churches unnecessarily expensive
loans,' 3 put pressure on pastors during negotiations, 4 and
sometimes engaged in "witch hunting."15 Church leaders likewise
expressed frustration with creditors' demands, unresponsiveness,
and "heartless" disrespect.' 6
Attorneys' and church leaders' perceptions that banks and
other lenders may have treated seemingly similar churches
differently aligns with prior research linking discrimination to
Blacks paying more than similarly situated whites for cars,
consumer goods and credit, home loans, and small business
credit.' 7 There likewise is a racial disparity in how individuals use
bankruptcy that results in Blacks paying more to discharge their
debts.'8 Indeed, bankruptcy filings provide a uniquely accessible
source of data to uncover the possibility of disparities in lenders'
treatment of churches.
11. Interview with Attorney 120, at 6 (Apr. 22, 2014); Interview with Attorney 5, at 4
(Mar. 2, 2013); Interview with Attorney 106, at 3 (Apr. 14, 2014).
12. See Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Less Forgiven: Race and Chapter 13
Bankruptcy, in BROKE: How DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS (Katherine Porter ed.,
2012) (describing Black debtors as 'less forgiven"). Lenders likely learned of congregants'
race in two ways. First, historically Black traditions are identifiable by church name. See
LINCOLN & MAMI1YA, supra note 1, at 1. Second, Black Churches almost exclusively employ
Black pastors and board members. See Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 8, at
1343-44. It was these people who called lenders, whereupon loan officers would detect their
"blackness" through their names and speech. See John Baugh, Linguistic Profiling, in
BLACK LINGUISTICS: LANGUAGE, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS (S.
Makoni, et al. eds., 2003) (discussing "linguistic profiling"); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (finding that
fictitious potential employees responding to help-wanted ads with white-sounding names
received 50% more callbacks than those with Black-sounding names).
13. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
14. Interview with Attorney 140, at 2 (May 6, 2014).
15. Interview with Attorney 137, at 2-3 (Apr. 30, 2014).
16. Interview with Leader 55, at 3 (May 6, 2013).
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. See generally Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney
Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 323 (2012).
2017] 1083
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Part II of this Article relies on my empirical investigation of
religious organizations' Chapter 11 cases to expose the
phenomenon of Black Churches in Chapter 11. To identify a reason
for the disproportion of Black Churches seeking to reorganize, Part
III turns to studies finding that racial discrimination results in
Blacks paying more than similarly situated whites for goods and
credit. Drawing on my interviews with attorneys and church
leaders, along with these studies, Part IV exposes the possibility
that lenders are handling their loans to churches disparately
based on congregations' demographics.
Part IV further focuses on two lenders whose loans frequently
appeared in religious organizations' Chapter 11 cases.19 A
snapshot of data I gathered of these two lenders' extensions of
credit to churches shows that they made loans to churches with a
variety of demographics. Yet of the Chapter 11 cases in which
these lenders appeared as creditors, Black Churches filed more
than 80%.20 These case studies provide additional support for my
hypothesis that race is a crucial factor in determining whether a
particular church will need to turn to Chapter 11 in order to
receive a modification of its loans.
This snapshot of lending also repudiates another possible reason
that Black Churches are over-represented in Chapter 11: They
finance the purchase or renovation of their buildings much more
frequently than other churches. Part V raises and dismisses this and
other reasons for the predominance of Black Churches in Chapter 11.
Because of data limitations, a sophisticated statistical analysis is not
possible.21 Nonetheless, available data allows for a comparison of the
characteristics of churches that filed under Chapter 11 to the
denominations and geographic locations of congregations
nationwide; 22 to the income and wealth of relevant populations; 23 and
to other churches' internal management and practices.
Chief among speculated reasons, denominations and locations
of church debtors cannot explain the disparity. Black Church
19. These two lenders sold secured loans to 9% of the debtors. See infra note 194 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra Part IV.C.
21. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
22. Congregation data are from the Association of Statisticians of American Religious
Bodies (ASARB) 2010 Religious Congregations and Membership Study. U.S.
Congregational Membership: Reports, ASS'N RELIGIOUs DATA ARCHIVES (2010),
http://www.thearda.com/RCMS2010/ [https://perma.cc/9HF2-9HRE]. Congregant data are
from the 2008 U.S. Religious Landscape Study. PEW RES. CTR., http://religions.pew
forum.org/ [https://perma.cc/C2ZC-AAMG].
23. Population data are from the United States Census Bureau's Census. QuickFacts:
United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/INC11
0215/00 [https://perma.cc/Y5X5-WPA8].
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debtors hail from judicial districts across the county. Some of these
districts are home to majority Black populations, some to mainly
white populations, and all to a mix of churches that does not align
with the denominations of the churches from those areas that
sought to reorganize. 24 Further, though the Black populations in
some of these areas are economically disadvantaged, churches
with primarily white membership also are economically stratified.
There are thousands of white congregations-similar to the Black
Churches that filed under Chapter 11-that did not turn to
bankruptcy. 25
Likewise, speculations about differences in Black Churches'
management, such as their leaders' propensity not to seek
professional advice, do not seem to account for the predominance
of Black Churches reorganizing. 26 A more plausible reason for the
prevalence of Black Churches in Chapter 11 must exist, which I
argue leaves the possibility that lenders' actions in loan
origination and modification is a significant contributing factor to
Black Churches in particular filing under Chapter 11.
Given the insufficiency of data available to establish whether
disparities in lending to churches are occurring and pushing Black
Churches into bankruptcy, Part VI assesses current laws prohibiting
discrimination in lending on two bases. First, whether these laws
may allow for discovery of more data to better evaluate if such
disparities in lending to churches truly are occurring. Second, if so,
whether these laws may provide redress for such discriminatory
practices. Part VI also considers the social implications of churches'
disparate use of reorganization and explores how Chapter 11 serves
as a last resort for Black Churches. Part VII concludes with a
discussion of the repercussions that this Article's findings have on
churches and communities.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF BLACK CHURCHES IN CHAPTER 11
A. Location, Denomination, and Demographics
Based on Court Records
During the eight-year period between the beginning of 2006 and
the end of 2013,27 626 unique religious organizations located in the
24. See infra Parts V.A-B.
25. See infra Part V.C.
26. See infra Part V.E.
27. The start of this timeframe coincides with the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23, which had an effective date of October 17, 2005. I chose a timeframe end
date that allowed for significant events to occur in the cases by the time of analysis.
10852017]
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fifty states and the District of Columbia filed a total of 697 Chapter
11 cases.28 In previous work, I detailed how I created the dataset
using court records. 29 Of note, that dataset included 8 cases filed by
the Catholic dioceses and related entities, 30 and excluded cases filed
by debtors that duplicated services provided in the private market,
such as YMCAs and hospitals.31
Of 90 possible federal judicial districts, religious organizations'
Chapter 11 cases came from 76 districts. Figure 1 presents a map of
the distribution of the filings across judicial districts. 19 districts
received only 1 case during the study timeframe, whereas 50% of the
filings clumped in 10 jurisdictions. 32 The Northern District of Georgia
alone received 10% of the total number of religious organizations'
cases during the study timeframe, followed by the Middle District of
Florida with 8% of filings and the Central District of California with
6% of filings.33
28. The number of religious organizations Chapter 11 cases filed is greater than the
number of unique religious organizations that filed because some debtors filed multiple
times during the study timeframe. The breakdown of cases filed by year of the study is:
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
# of Cases 43 72 88 87 96 118 106 87
The low filing rate in 2006 is explained by the enactment of BAPCPA. See Robert M.
Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82
AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 350-51 (2008) (noting bankruptcy filing statistics).
29. My prior work relied on a dataset of religious organizations' Chapter 11 filings in
the 50 United States and the District of Columbia from 2006 through 2011. Pamela Foohey,
When Churches Reorganize, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 277, 278-79 (2014) [hereinafter Foohey,
When Churches Reorganize]; Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 9, at 730-32. I used
the same methodology to identify cases filed in 2012 and 2013. The full dataset is on file
with the Author.
30. In prior work, I excluded these cases because they resemble mass tort cases.
Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 9, at 731-32 & n.80. In this Article, as indicated
infra, for the same reason, I exclude Catholic cases from financial calculations.
31. Id. at 732. The dataset includes one Jewish community center. Arguably, if
YMCAs are excluded, this debtor should be excluded for the same reason. Its inclusion does
not alter any of the results. I also combined jointly administered cases and counted
combined cases as one case. Id. at 731.
32. See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 9, at 735.
33. In order, these districts received 69, 56, and 43 of the 697 filings.
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The distribution of religious organization Chapter 11 cases does
not match where Chapter 7, 11, or 13 cases are filed or where
congregations concentrate across the country.34
Figure 1: Percentage of Religious Organization Chapter 11
Filings by Federal Judicial District
January 2006 - December 2013
S.2% -9.9%
S3.2% - 4.2%M.,
In previous work, I argued that the clumping evident in Figure
1 partly is a function of social networking among church leaders. 35
Importantly for this Article, leaders did not turn to their social
networks for help in deciding how to deal with their churches'
financial problems until after their creditors declined to negotiate
consensually, and instead initiated or threatened foreclosure. 36 Of
the total 697 religious organization debtors that filed during the
study timeframe, 654 debtors primarily operated places of worship.
Almost all (625, or 96%) of those debtors were from Christian
traditions.37
Concentrating on those debtors that operated Christian places
of worship, as summarized in Table 2, a disproportionate percentage
of filings were of non-denominational and congregationalist
churches, such as Apostolic and Church of God in Christ (COGIC)
churches. 38 Congregationalist churches are not subject to broad
34. See Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 280; U.S. Congregational
Membership: Reports, supra note 22.
35. Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 286.
36. Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 8, at 1346-49.
37. Nationwide, 97% of congregations are affiliated with Christianity. See U.S.
Congregational Membership: Reports, supra note 22.
38. Table 1's debtor figures are based on the number of Chapter 11 cases filed. If a
debtor filed more than once during the study timeframe, it is counted as many times as it
filed. Table 1 includes every denomination with which at least one debtor was affiliated. I
identified affiliations based on the debtor's name, representations in case filings, internet
searches of the debtor's and leader's name, as disclosed in filings, and interviews with
debtors' leaders and attorneys. I categorized each Catholic diocese as one congregation.
Debtors with "unclear" affiliations did not file sufficiently detailed pleadings or are not
locatable online. Congregation data are from the U.S. Congregational Membership: Reports,
10872017]
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governing bodies and run their affairs internally with minimal
outside intrusion or support. 39 In contrast, those churches affiliated
with more structured denominations, such as Lutheran and United
Methodist, are noticeably lacking among religious organization
debtors. 40
Table 1: Affiliations of Christian Religious Organization Chapter 11
Debtors Versus Affiliations of Christian Congregations Nationwide
Debtors Congregations
N % N %
Nondenominational 243 38.9 35,496 10.7
Baptist-Generic 78 12.5 69,892 21.0
Missionary Baptist 55 8.8 1,283 0.4
Full Gospel Baptist 5 0.8 699 0.2
Church of God in Christ 51 8.2 3,119 0.9
Apostolic 23 3.7 1,033 0.3
Church of God 11 1.8 11,979 3.6
Assemblies of God 10 1.6 12,258 3.7
Pentecostal-Generic 9 1.4 6,360 1.9
Catholic 8 1.3 20,812 6.2
Churches of Christ 8 1.3 23,594 7.1
African Methodist Episcopal 4 0.6 5,913 1.8
Lutheran 4 0.6 18,796 5.6
Presbyterian 3 0.5 14,820 4.4
United Methodist 3 0.5 33,323 10.0
Church of the Nazarene 2 0.3 5,056 1.5
Orthodox 2 0.3 2,309 0.7
Amish /Mennonite 1 0.2 3,183 1.0
Disciples of Christ 1 0.2 3,625 1.1
Episcopal 1 0.2 6,794 2.0
Other 0 0.0 52,908 15.9
Unclear 103 16.5 0 0.0
TOTAL 625 100.0 333,252 100.0
supra note 22; see also Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 284-85
(discussing various Christian sects).
39. See Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 284-85.
40. See id. at 284-86; K. Peter Takayama, Formal Polity and Change of Structure:
Denominational Assemblies, 35 Soc. ANALYSIS 17 (1975) (studying the structural features
of twenty-nine Protestant denominations, including Lutheran and United Methodist).
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The demographics of debtors operating places of worship
also do not correspond with the demographics of congregations
across the country. The striking proportion of debtors affiliated
with the Missionary Baptist tradition foreshadows this disparity.
Missionary Baptist is one of a handful of historically Black
denominations, including African Methodist Episcopal, COGIC,
and Full Gospel Baptist.4 ' Across the country, 5% of congregations
are historically Black.42 As reported in Table 2, among places of
worship that filed Chapter 11 during the study timeframe, 18%
were historically Black. 43
Also as reported in Table 2, churches not affiliated with
historically Black denominations, but with predominately Black
membership, filed under Chapter 11 in substantial numbers.
These "other" Black Churches comprise about 16% of
congregations nationwide. 44 They likewise appear almost three
times as often in the population of Chapter 11 religious
congregation debtors.
41. The 2010 Religious Congregations and Membership Study categorizes these and the
following denominations as historically Black Churches: Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Cumberland Presbyterian
Church in America, National Baptist Convention of America, National Baptist Convention,
USA, Inc., Progressive National Baptist Convention, and United Holy Church of America. See
Black Protestant Denominations, ASS'N RELIGIOUS DATA ARCHIVES, http://www.thearda.com/
rcms2010/blackprot.asp [https://perma.cc/C2D3-C92M].
42. U.S. Membership Report, AsS'N RELIGIOUS DATA ARCHIVES (2010), http://www.the
arda.com/rcms2l0/r/u/rcms2OlO_99_USname_2010.asp [https://perma.cc/PJK7-UQ94]. This
figure includes non-Christian congregations.
43. Table 2 reports the predominate demographic of a debtor's membership. I
identified race based on internet searches of the debtor's and/or leader's name and address,
as disclosed in court filings. "Multiracial" refers to a congregation having no more than 80%
of one racial group. See CURTISS PAUL DEYOUNG, ET AL., UNITED BY FAITH: THE
MULTIRACIAL CONGREGATION As AN ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM OF RACE 2 (2004) (defining
multiracial congregation); Mark Chaves & Shawna L. Anderson, Changing American
Congregations: Findings from the Third Wave of the National Congregations Study, 53 J.
SCl. STUDY RELIGION 676, 680 (2014) (reporting that 86% of American congregations are
comprised of one racial group). If the debtor was affiliated with a historically Black
denomination, I automatically categorized it as a Black Church. If I could not find other
indications of demographics, if the debtor's leader appeared Black, I categorized the
congregation as Black, and if a debtor's leader appeared white (44 debtors), I categorized
that debtor as having "unclear" demographics. See DEYOUNG, supra, at 2 (explaining that
most multiracial congregations are led by white pastors and that a congregation typically
becomes predominately Black if a Black pastor is hired). I also relied on interviews with
debtors' leaders and attorneys to categorize congregations. The "unclear" category is large
because many debtors were not locatable online.
44. Black Churches comprise 21% of congregations nationwide. See Continuity and
Change in American Congregations, supra note 4. Subtracting the 5% that are historically
Black Churches yields 16%.
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Table 2: Demographics of Religious Organization
Chapter 11 Debtors Operating Places of Worship
N %
Historically Black Christian 115 17.6
Other Black Christian 280 42.8
White Christian 21 3.2
Hispanic Christian 6 0.9
Asian Christian 4 0.6
Multiracial Christian 10 1.5
Unclear Christian 189 28.9
Jewish 19 2.9
Muslim/Buddhist/Hindu 10 1.5
TOTAL 654 100.0
In total, 60% of religious congregation Chapter 11 debtors
were Black Churches. To compare, 21% of congregations
nationwide have membership that is at least 80% Black. 45
Moreover, my interviews with attorneys who represented a subset
of the religious organization Chapter 11 debtors suggest that 60%
is a low estimate of the percentage of religious organization
debtors that were Black Churches.
B. Denomination and Demographics Based on Interviews
1. Bankruptcy Attorneys. To supplement the court records, I
telephonically interviewed bankruptcy attorneys who represented
religious organizations that filed for Chapter 11 between January 1,
2006, and December 31, 2011.46 From a random sample of 180
attorneys to whom I mailed letters regarding the study,47 14 were not
45. See id.
46. I chose a timeframe two years shorter than the study timeframe to track
post-bankruptcy outcomes and operations.
47. First I reached out to ninety attorneys who represented religious organizations
located in the ten "hot" districts. I conducted these interviews between April and July of 2013.
Next I reached out to ninety attorneys who represented religious organizations located in the
other districts. I conducted these interviews in April and May 2014. For a description of my
methodology, see Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 281-82. I conducted
the interviews based on scripted, open-ended questions from which I occasionally deviated.
See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 501, 512-13 (1993) (interviewing bankruptcy attorneys and trustees using the
same methodology); Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net:A Study of Earned Income
Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 526-27 (2013)
(describing scripted open-ended interview methodology). Participants were not compensated.
Prior to soliciting interviews, I obtained approval of the procedures from the University of
Illinois's Institutional Review Board. Each of the respondents consented to my audio recording
1090 [54:5
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locatable48 and 76 agreed to interviews, for a response rate of 46%.49
The interviews lasted an average of 33 minutes, during which I asked
about the attorneys' practices and their religious organization clients.
As reported by the interviewed attorneys, these attorneys
represented 109 of the 461 unique religious organizations that
filed under Chapter 11 in the six years between January 2006 and
December 2011, and another 36 religious organizations that filed
outside the study timeframe. The attorneys practiced in a total of
39 districts. Table 3 summarizes the affiliations of the attorneys'
clients that filed during the six-year timeframe, as reported by
attorneys.50
Table 3: Affiliations of Interviewed Attorneys'
Religious Organization Clients
N %
Non-denominational Christian 50 45.9
Baptist - Generic 16 14.7
Missionary Baptist 16 14.7
Church of God in Christ 7 6.4
Apostolic 4 3.7
Christian - Other Denominations 8 7.3
Christian - School 2 1.8
Other Religions 6 5.5
TOTAL 109 100.0
The affiliations of attorneys' religious organization clients
generally align with the affiliations of all religious organizations
that filed under Chapter 11 during the study timeframe, with the
exception of Missionary Baptist churches, which appear more
often among attorneys' clients than in the population of religious
organization Chapter 11 debtors. 51
Focusing on the demographics of the interviewed attorneys'
clients that operated places of worship, as reported by attorneys and
as set forth in Table 4, 79% were Black Churches. This percentage
likely is slightly inflated because of the over-representation of
of the interview. I transcribed and coded the interviews myself. To preserve anonymity, I
identify each interviewee based on a randomly assigned interview ID number. Interview
scripts and transcriptions are on file with the Author.
48. These attorneys had left law practice or moved to government or in-house. The
letters I sent were returned, and I could not find telephone numbers for them.
49. The response rate for the first round was 42%. See Foohey, When Faith Falls
Short, supra note 8, at 1344. The response rate for the second round was 49%.
50. Table 3 combines some denominations to preserve interviewee anonymity.
51. See supra Table 1.
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Missionary Baptist churches among attorneys' clients. Accounting
for this over-representation, Black Churches most likely comprised
75% of the interviewed attorneys' clients.52
Table 4: Demographics of Attorneys' Religious
Organization Clients Operating Places of Worship
N %
Historically Black Christian 26 24.3
Other Black Christian 58 54.2
White Christian 4 3.7
Asian Christian 2 1.9
Multiracial Christian 1 0.9
Unclear Christian 10 9.3
Jewish / Muslim / Buddhist / Hindu 6 5.6
TOTAL 107 100.0
Except for a few attorneys, 53 attorneys were aware of the
racial makeup of their clients' members based on their visits to the
churches and interactions with leadership and congregants. 54
Attorneys' experiences thus suggest that more religious
organization Chapter 11 debtors were Black Churches than the
conservative estimate of 60% based on court records.
2. Religious Organization Leaders. Additionally, I interviewed
45 leaders from 43 unique religious organizations that filed during
the eight-year study timeframe.55 5 of the religious organization
52. Taking the 54.2% of Black Churches in Table 4, adding the 17.6% of historically
Black Churches among the full population of religious organization Chapter 11 debtors, as
reported in Table 2, and assuming that 50% of the over-represented portion of historically
Black Churches among attorneys' clients were Black Churches (3.4%), the percentage of
Black Churches would be 75.2%.
53. These religious organizations are categorized as "unclear" in Table 4.
54. The possibility that the interviewed attorneys represented a disproportionate
number of Black Churches as compared to the population of religious organization debtors
cannot be ruled out entirely.
55. Two leaders asked me to speak with another member of their organizations'
leadership team. I conducted two rounds of interviews. For a description of my methodology,
see Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 282-83. First I reached out to
leaders of every religious organization in the ten "hot" districts that filed between Jan. 1, 2006
and Dec. 31, 2011. I mailed letters to 226 leaders, 93 of whom I successfully contacted. The
other 133 organizations' phones were disconnected and the leaders did not respond on their
own initiative. See id. at 282. 10 leaders agreed to interviews, for a response rate of 11%. Prior
to soliciting these interviews, I obtained approval of the procedures from the University of
Illinois's Institutional Review Board. These leaders were not offered compensation. For the
second round of interviews, I obtained approval of the same procedures from Indiana
University's Human Subjects Office, with one addition: Leaders were offered a $50 gift card.
I mailed letters to 395 leaders of organizations that filed in districts other than the ten "hot"
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debtors had primary operations other than places of worship.56 The
interviews lasted an average of 41 minutes, during which I asked
about the organizations' history, bankruptcy, and post-bankruptcy
operations. As detailed in Table 5, 71% of the interviewed leaders
affiliated with religious congregations came from Black Churches.
Table 5: Demographics of Interviewed Leaders'
Organizations Operating Places of Worship
N %
Historically Black Christian 6 15.8
Black Christian 21 55.3
White Christian 5 13.2
Asian Christian 1 2.6
Multiracial Christian 5 13.2
TOTAL 38 100.0
Because leaders from churches with particular demographics
may have been more likely to respond to my requests for interviews,
71% likely is not an accurate estimate of the percentage of Black
Churches that filed Chapter 11. Most concerning, white churches
may have been more likely to successfully reorganize or otherwise
survive for the same underlying reasons that drove Black Churches
to bankruptcy.57
Nonetheless, the percentage of white churches whose leaders
I interviewed is very low. In contrast, the percentage of multiracial
churches is significantly higher than what I was able to determine
based on court records and Internet searches. This suggests that
a sizable minority of congregation Chapter 11 debtors had
multiracial membership.58 Regardless, interviewed leaders
overwhelmingly came from Black Churches, which is consistent
with the over-representation of Black Churches among religious
congregation Chapter 11 debtors.
districts from Jan. 1, 2006 to Dec. 31, 2011, and leaders of organizations that filed in any
district from Jan. 1, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2013. I successfully contacted 152 of these organizations.
The other 243 organizations' phones were disconnected and the leaders did not respond on
their own initiative. Of the 152 organizations that I contacted, 33 leaders agreed to interviews,
for a response rate of 22%. Given the low response rate, I rely on my interviews with leaders
to augment attorneys' observations.
56. These debtors operated educational institutions and missions.
57. See infra Part IV. Linguistic profiling also may have skewed which leaders were
willing to speak with me. See generally Baugh, supra note 12. No leaders from Jewish or
Hispanic congregations responded; two leaders were from Jewish educational institutions.
58. See supra Table 2.
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C. Race Matters in Business Bankruptcy
Exposing that Black Churches disproportionately use
Chapter 11 is important itself. What I have found is yet another
instance in which race matters in bankruptcy. 59 It also is the
first instance to implicate the business provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. Black Churches not only turn to Chapter 11
more frequently than other churches, but Chapter 11 may
provide a safe haven for them in ways not as relevant to other
churches and small businesses. Considering why bankruptcy is
utilized in this business context is critical to debates about the
extent to which a robust bankruptcy option is useful for small
businesses. 60
Moreover, understanding why Black Churches are filing
under Chapter 11 in numbers inconsistent with their incidence in
the population may yield insights into how lenders manage loans
to churches. Religious organizations overwhelmingly turned to
bankruptcy to save their buildings from foreclosure. 61 Based on
assets and debts, they had financial profiles similar to smaller
businesses: they owed a median of $1.05 million in debt, and had
assets worth a median of $1.29 million.62 Their largest assets were
buildings, which accounted for a median of 96% of the total value
of their assets. 63 In turn, they owed one or two creditors holding
security interests in these buildings a median of 93% of their total
debt.64
That a church owed a large portion of its debts to one or two
secured creditors, seemingly giving those creditors substantial
negotiating leverage, may be significant to explaining the
predominance of Black Churches in Chapter 11. When a church
falls behind on loan payments, it may come to a consensual loan
modification with its lender, much like what would happen in
Chapter 11, but obviating the need to file. Based on my interviews,
59. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 Mo.
L. REV. 921 (2006) [hereinafter Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform]; Dickerson,
Race Matters in Bankruptcy, supra note 9 (documenting how the Code favors an "ideal
debtor" with financial and life characteristics more common among white households).
60. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy's Rarity: An Essay on Small Business
Bankruptcy in the United States, 5 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 172, 187-88 (2008)
(discussing whether having access to bankruptcy is productive for small businesses); see
also infra Part VI.B.
61. See supra note 5.
62. Foohey, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 54.
63. Id.
64. Id. The religious organizations' Chapter 11 cases also resemble single-asset real
estate (SARE) cases. See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 9, at 768-71
(comparing and contrasting SAREs and religious organizations' cases).
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leaders of churches that ultimately filed under Chapter 11 asked
for modification deals from their creditors long before they ever
thought of reorganizing. 65 But based on my interviews and
extrapolating from the disparity in religious organization Chapter
11 filings, such deals for Black Churches were not forthcoming.
Instead, lenders may have denied Black Churches in particular
loan modifications, and possibly sold Black Churches relatively
expensive loans in the first place.
Black Churches thus may have turned to Chapter 11 to try to
force deals-and seemingly often successfully did so. More than
half of the religious organizations' Chapter 11 cases ended in a
confirmed reorganization plan or a consensual resolution.66 But
Chapter 11 is expensive and time-consuming. Black Church
leaders had to find a bankruptcy attorney, who most likely
required a retainer of over $10,000,67 and had to pay the $1,000
filing fee.6 8 Their pastors also had to spend countless hours
meeting the requirements of Chapter 11,69 time that could have
been spent attending to their members and communities.
Interviewed leaders lamented how much time and energy they
spent attending to cases, how "the finances of th[e] church end[ed]
up being the center of [their] focus as opposed to ministry,"70 and
how sometimes they didn't think they were "going to make it," but
were determined to "make sure that all the paperwork was
accurate and correct."71
The hypothesis that Black Churches had to pay to modify
their loans in part because of their lenders' actions is consistent
with studies finding that Blacks pay more than similarly situated
65. See Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 8, at 1343-44, 1346-48
(discussing leaders' progression from dealing with lenders to placing their churches in
Chapter 11).
66. Foohey, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 58.
67. Excluding Catholic dioceses and Crystal Cathedral Ministries (the largest
non-Catholic case filed during the study timeframe), court records show that attorneys
requested an average retainer in real dollars as of the petition date of $10,750. See supra
note 29.
68. See Temporary Bankruptcy Judgeships Extension Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-121, § 3(a), 126 Stat. 346, 348 (2012) (noting that the previous fee was $1,000). The
Chapter 11 filing fee increased for cases filed on or after November 21, 2012 from a total of
$1,046 to $1,213. See Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing Fees to Increase, U.S. CTS.
(July 6, 2012), http://news.uscourts.gov/chapter-1 1-bankruptcy-filing-fees-increase [https://
perma.cc/K2GZ-TKCA] (including the filing fee plus the $46 administrative fee).
69. See infra note 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the filings required
during Chapter 11. Debtors also must spend time negotiating plans and settlements,
attending hearings, and meeting with their attorneys.
70. Interview with Leader 52, at 3 (May 3, 2013).
71. Interview with Leader 59, at 7-8 (Mar. 17, 2014).
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whites across a range of financial transactions. 72 The next Part
turns to those studies. Part IV links those studies with my
interviews to posit that the demographic disparity in church
Chapter 11 filings exposes for the first time the possibility of
associated disparities in lending to churches, both in loan
origination and modification.
III. BLACKS PAY MORE
A. Cars, Homes, and Credit
Empirical studies have established that Blacks pay more
than other consumers for goods, such as cars and homes, 73 and
financial products, such as credit cards.74 Studies controlling for
the risk factors lenders consider in underwriting loans further
have shown that lenders reject applications submitted by Blacks
72. See infra Part III; see also Morrison, supra note 60, at 174 (noting that a
"surprisingly large number of small business cases" are resolved consensually, and positing
that bankruptcy may "be needed by firms that have lost the trust of their creditors").
73. See, e.g., lan Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in
Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995) (finding statistically significant
differences in prices quoted to test car buyers based on race); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving:
Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817,
817-18 (1991) [hereinafter Ayres, Fair Driving] (studying racial and gender disparities in
new car pricing at dealerships in Chicago); Kathryn Graddy & Diana C. Robertson, Fairness
of Pricing Decisions, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q. 225, 225-26 (1999) (finding that fast-food franchises
set prices based on neighborhood demographics); Gregory D. Squires, Racial Profiling,
Insurance Style: Insurance Redlining and the Uneven Development of Metropolitan Areas,
25 J.U. AFF. 391, 392 (2003) (documenting racial profiling in the property insurance
industry); Patrick Buyer et al., Estimating Racial Price Differentials in the Housing Market
5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18069, 2012), http://
www.nber.org/papers/wl8069.pdf [https://perma.ce/3UJX-TT3L] (relying on a dataset of
housing transactions in four metropolitan areas over two decades to establish that Blacks
pay 3-3.5% more for their homes than whites in almost every purchase setting). But see
Pinelopi Koujianoi Goldberg, Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases: Evidence
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 104 J. POL. ECON. 622, 651-52 (1996) (using
regression analysis to explore price discrimination in car sales and concluding that there is
"no evidence of price discrimination against blacks or women").
74. Ethan Cohen-Cole, Credit Card Redlining, 93 REV. ECON. & STATS. 700, 700-02
(2011) (finding that lenders set credit limits based on the racial composition of
neighborhoods); see also Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit
Card Problem, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 151, 153, 168 (2013) ("The credit card industry has also
developed a subprime market for vulnerable consumers."); Wendy Edelberg, Racial
Dispersion in Consumer Credit Interest Rates (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion
Series, Working Paper No. 2007-28, 2007), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/
200728/200728pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D4Z-H8U4] (examining racial dispersion in
loans);cf. Jim Hawkins, Are Bigger Companies Better for Low-Income Borrowers?: Evidence
from Payday and Title Loan Advertisements, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 303, 325 (finding Blacks
make up 35% of pictures in advertising on payday and title lenders websites in Houston
despite comprising 20% of the population). But see Kenneth P. Brevoort, Credit Card
Redlining Revisited, 93 REV. EcoN. & STATS. 714, 723-24 (2011) (using the same dataset
as Cohen-Cole and suggesting that redlining may not be present).
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far more frequently than those submitted by whites.75 And if
lenders decide to extend credit to Blacks, they charge them more
than whites for that credit.76 Across these lending scenarios,
Blacks are less likely than whites to apply for credit in the first
instance because they believe that lenders will deny them
credit.77
The same dynamic of lenders denying loan applications,
charging more for credit, and applicants deciding not to seek
funds at all occurs in the context of lending to Black-owned
businesses. Lenders deny Black business owners' requests for
loans more frequently than white business owners, and Black
business owners also face a higher probability of receiving a
smaller loan amount than they requested.78 Consequently,
75. See Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 1761-64 (2004)
(discussing studies finding that Blacks are more likely to be rejected for home mortgages
than whites); Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, The Transition to Home Ownership and
the Black-White Wealth Gap, 84 REV. EcON. & STATS. 281, 293-94 (2002) (finding that
Blacks are twice as likely to be rejected for home loans than whites).
76. See, e.g., Ping Cheng, Zhenguo Lin & Yingchun Liu, Racial Discrepancy in
Mortgage Interest Rates, 51 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 101, 118 (2015) (using data from the
U.S. Survey of Consumer Finance to find that Black borrowers pay an average of 29 basis
points more than comparable white borrowers for home loans); Debbie Gruenstein Bocian,
Keith S. Ernest & Wie Li, Race, Ethnicity, and Subprime Home Loan Pricing, 60 J. ECON.
& Bus. 110, 111 (2008) (finding that Black borrowers are more likely to receive higher-rate
subprime home loans than white borrowers); Kerwin Kofi Charles, Erik Hurst & Melvin
Stephens, Jr., Rates for Vehicle Loans: Race and Loan Source, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 315, 315,
319 (2008) (finding that some Blacks received higher interest rates on auto loans originated
from vehicle manufacturers, though not on auto loans originated from traditional lenders);
Mark A. Cohen, Imperfect Competition in Auto Lending: Subjective Markup, Racial
Disparity, and Class Action Litigation, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 21, 31-33 (2012) (reviewing
evidence of the subjective markup of auto loans to Blacks).
77. See Charles, Hurst & Stephens, supra note 76, at 319 (noting that Blacks finance
their cars through manufacturers' finance companies); Charles & Hurst, supra note 75, at
282 (finding that Blacks are less likely than whites to apply for home loans); David A. Skeel,
Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1695, 1713-14
(2004) (describing studies assessing credit market discrimination).
78. See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower et al., Discrimination in the Small-Business
Credit Market, 85 REv. ECON. & STAT. 930, 930-31 (2003) (using data from the National
Surveys of Small Business Finances to examine the existence of racial discrimination in the
market for small business credit); Ken S. Cavalluzo & John Wolken, Small Business Loan
Turndowns, Personal Wealth, and Discrimination, 78 J. BUS. 2153, 2154 (2005) (finding
higher loan denial rates to Black entrepreneurs regardless of personal wealth); Ken S.
Cavalluzo, Linda C. Cavalluzo & John D. Wolken, Competition, Small Business Financing,
and Discrimination: Evidence from a New Survey, 75 J. Bus. 641, 643-44 (2002) (finding
that Black business owners who applied for credit were more likely to be denied credit and
that they avoided applying for credit); Naranchimeg Mijid & Alexandra Bernasek,
Decomposing Racial and Ethnic Differences in Small Business Lending: Evidence of
Discrimination, 71 REV. Soc. ECON. 443, 445 (2013) (finding that minority business owners
have a 24% higher loan denial rate and a 5% higher probability of less funds than
requested); Darius Palia, Differential Access to Capital from Financial Institutions by
Minority Entrepreneurs, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 756, 781 (2016) (finding that
Black-owned firms are rejected for loans at a higher rate than white-owned firms of similar
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Blacks turn to credit cards more often than whites to fund their
businesses.79
Blacks seem to pay more in every imaginable lending
scenario. For example, an investigation of one online peer-to-peer
lending site found that loan listings that included pictures of Black
applicants were 25%-35% less likely to receive funding than
listings with the same credit profile featuring pictures of white
applicants.80 Black borrowers who received funding were charged
interest rates sixty to eighty basis points higher than white
borrowers with the same credit profile.81
B. Consumer Bankruptcy
Blacks also pay more when they cannot repay their more
expensive debts. As compared to similarly situated white
consumers, Black consumers are more likely to file under
Chapter 13 than Chapter 7.82 Chapter 13 is significantly more
expensive monetarily than Chapter 7.83 It also is a much longer
proceeding. It takes three to five years to receive a Chapter 13
discharge, versus within six months to receive a Chapter 7
discharge.84
Black debtors do not necessarily pay more to discharge their
debts of their own accord. Rather, it appears that some attorneys
steer their Black clients to Chapter 13 while counseling similarly
situated white clients to file under Chapter 7. Attorneys' responses
to an experimental vignette designed by Jean Braucher, Dov
Cohen, and Robert Lawless to ascertain how attorneys guide a
debtor toward a particular bankruptcy Chapter revealed that, on
average, attorneys seemed to want Black clients to "earn" their
bankruptcy discharge.85
risk).
79. See Aaron K. Chatterji & Robert C. Seamans, Entrepreneurial Finance, Credit
Cards, and Race, 106 J. FIN. EcoN. 182, 193 (2012) (noting that friction with traditional
banks seems to cause Blacks to turn to credit cards).
80. Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, What's in a Picture? Evidence of
Discrimination from Prosper.com, 46 J. HUM. RESOURCES 53, 53-55 (2011).
81. Id. at 55.
82. Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 404; Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two
Debtors: Bankruptcy Disparities by Race, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231, 234 (2009) (finding that
Blacks are three times more likely to file under Chapter 13 than whites and that they are
less likely to receive a discharge than similarly situated white debtors).
83. See Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 394 (noting that Chapter 13
attorneys' fees range from $2,500 to $3,000, as compared to Chapter 7 attorneys' fees of
about $1,000).
84. See id. (discussing the timing of Chapter 7 and 13 proceedings).
85. Id. at 393-94, 414; see also A. Mechele Dickerson, Racial Steering in Bankruptcy,
20 ABI L. REV. 623, 630-31 (2012) [hereinafter, Dickerson, Racial Steering] (discussing why
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The vignette requested that the attorney advise a couple
thinking of filing for bankruptcy. The vignette was designed such
that an attorney would face a close call deciding whether to
recommend filing under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.86 An attorney
thus could feel comfortable recommending Chapter 7 or Chapter
13 depending on what the couple desired. The vignettes varied the
debtors' names and church affiliations to signal Black and white,
and whether the couple indicated that they wanted to file Chapter
7 or 13.87
In the study, attorneys viewed Black clients as competent
and having "good values" when they expressed a preference for
paying back their debts through the more expensive and
time-consuming Chapter 13 process.88 In contrast, attorneys
viewed white clients as competent when they expressed a
preference for Chapter 7.89 Consistent with these views,
attorneys, on average, protected confused "good" (white) clients
from Chapter 13, and punished unrepentant "bad" (Black) clients
with Chapter 7.90
As noted by Mechele Dickerson, these categorizations track
with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)'s implicit grouping of consumer debtors as
"good" and "bad."91 BAPCPA altered the process by which
consumers can access Chapter 7 by adding a means test that
examines a debtor's income versus expenses. 92 Only those debtors
who "can't pay" may file under Chapter 7 and access the faster
discharge; "can pay" debtors have not earned this right.93
Statements made by members of Congress leading up to the
enactment of BAPCPA indicate that they were reacting to the
same value judgments that consumer bankruptcy attorneys
seemed to impose on their clients. Reform was needed to stop
people from using bankruptcy "to cheat their way out of debt"94
and to reestablish "personal responsibility and integrity."96
it is difficult to file under either Chapter 7 or 13 pro se and why consumers turn to attorneys
for help).
86. See Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 409 (describing the vignette).
87. Id. at 405-08.
88. Id. at 413-16.
89. Id. at 413-14.
90. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 625-27 (discussing the study).
91. Id. at 628.
92. The means test is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A) (2012). See Dickerson,
Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 627 & n. 19 (discussing the means test and its history).
93. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 627 (noting that BAPCPA
groups debtors into "can pays" and "can't pays").
94. 151 CONG. REC. E737 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2005) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt).
95. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005); see also Dickerson, Race Matters in
2017] 1099
1100 HOUSTON LA WREVIEW [54:5
Though BAPCPA's changes to the Code affected all debtors, the
impetus behind the changes sprung from a similar negative view
of debtors that bankruptcy attorneys, on average, imposed on their
hypothetical Black clients.96
C. Discrimination in Financial Transactions
and Other Settings
That the Code is written with an "ideal debtor" in mind accords
with one explanation of why Blacks pay more for goods and credit
and are steered toward a more expensive bankruptcy proceeding
than similarly situated whites-racial discrimination. 97 The studies
discussed above controlled for income, wealth, and other factors that
may have explained the racial disparity in financial transactions.98
The disparity seemingly persisted despite these controls, leading to
the conclusion that race alone partially influenced both lending
decisions and bankruptcy advice.99
Racial discrimination refers to the unequal treatment of a
person or a group based on race.100 Economic studies finding racial
discrimination typically distinguish between two forms of
discrimination-taste-based and statistical. 101 Taste-based (or
prejudicial) discrimination refers to adverse treatment based on
overt animus.102  Statistical discrimination arises from
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 59, at 938-39 (detailing the congressional debates).
96. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 628 (comparing the views of
members of Congress to the views of bankruptcy attorneys from the study).
97. See Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, supra note 59, at 1743 (documenting
how the Code favors an "ideal debtor"); Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at
646-47 (linking discrimination to the attorneys' steering of clients based on race); Daniel
Keating, From 'Fair Driving" to "Fair Discharging": Racially Disparate Outcomes in
Common Consumer Transactions, 20 ABI L. REV. 701, 701-02 (2012) (comparing Ayres's
"fair driving" study to the results of the Braucher, Cohen and Lawless vignette "Chapter
Choice" study).
98. See, e.g., Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 402-04 (detailing
controls); Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 59, at 1761 n.62 and
accompanying text (noting that studies controlled for risk factors lenders consider in
underwriting loans).
99. See, e.g., Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 394 (suggesting that
"subtle biases" led to the racial sorting); Cavalluzzo & Wolken, supra note 78, at 2153-54
(noting that personal wealth, among other factors, does not explain the higher loan denial
rate among Black business owners). But see D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil
Rights Litigation, 122 HARv. L. REV. 533, 534, 543-48 (2008) (discussing problems of using
regression analysis to predict causation in the context of racial discrimination).
100. See Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV.
Soc. 181, 182 (2008) (defining racial discrimination).
101. These two categories were first proposed in GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971).
102. See Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial
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assumptions about characteristics of people from a group that lead
others to treat members of that group in a particular way based
on seemingly "neutral" factors. 103 Though decisions that, when
aggregated, create disparate impacts across race do not arise from
direct hatred of people from a particular group, the result
nonetheless is detrimental to individuals within that group,
producing and reinforcing disadvantage. 10 4 The dichotomy
between taste-based and statistical discrimination accords with
research regarding explicit and implicit bias.105
In the economic context, statistical discrimination may take
two sub-forms: cost-based and revenue-based.106 Cost-based
discrimination occurs when sellers or lenders think that dealing
with members of certain groups imposes greater costs.1 07
Revenue-based discrimination occurs when sellers or lenders
think that people from certain groups are willing to pay more than
people from other groups.108
Discrimination, of course, manifests in a variety of settings
apart from financial transactions. Studies pinpointing discrimination
offer additional examples of how racial discrimination plays out in
society. Sociological research has linked "colorism," or discrimination
based on the lightness or darkness of a person's skin, with perceived
intelligence. 09 Studies further connect discrimination to physicians'
medical treatment recommendations, to human resources
personnel's offering of job interviews, and to jurors' interpretation of
ambiguous evidence about the commission of a crime. 110
As a final example, a recent field experiment in which trained
testers, some who appeared white and some who appeared Black,
attempted to board buses with empty fare cards, uncovered
Discrimination?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 94 (1998) (discussing taste-based discrimination).
103. See id. at 96-97 (discussing statistical discrimination). See generally Edmund S.
Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972)
(expanding on Becker's analysis of statistical discrimination).
104. See Pager & Shepherd, supra note 100, at 197-200 (discussing "structural
discrimination"); Barbara Reskin, The Race Discrimination System, 38 ANN. REV. Soc. 17,
17 (2012) (arguing that "race discrimination is a system whose emergent properties
reinforce the effects of their components").
105. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 643-44 (discussing the implicit
bias that accompanies stereotyping). Much of the research regarding implicit bias comes from
the Implicit Association Test (IAT). See id. at 645-46 (discussing the IAT); PROJECT IMPLICIT,
https://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html [https://perma.cc/9MVN-5UJK| (same).
106. See Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 73, at 843-45.
107. See id. at 843 (discussing cost-based discrimination in car sales).
108. See id. at 843-45 (discussing revenue-based discrimination in car sales).
109. Whites are more likely to view Blacks and Latinos with lighter skin as intelligent
as compared to those people with darker skin, regardless of education level. See Lance
Hannon, White Colorism, 2 Soc. CURRENTS 13, 18 (2015).
110. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 645-46 & n.91 (discussing studies).
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substantial discrimination."'1 Bus drivers accepted white testers
at a rate twice that at which they accepted Black testers-72%
versus 36%.112 In short, white testers were more likely to receive
one-off beneficial accommodations. 1 13
Across these instances, people may not perceive their actions
as discriminatory, and instead point to other reasons to explain
and justify their decisions and actions.1 14 Indeed, research shows
that people whose actions amount to discrimination may aspire to
be and consider themselves non-prejudiced.115 Nonetheless,
context strongly influences people's actions, 16 particularly in
ambiguous situations where the non-prejudicial choice is not
entirely clear,117 such as whether to allow someone to ride the bus
for free.
IV. BLACK CHURCHES PAY MORE
Black Churches taking out loans to finance their buildings and
later approaching their lenders for help when they fall behind on
payments present two interconnected scenarios eerily similar to the
financial contexts in which Blacks pay more for reasons at least
partially related to race. Analogizing from the studies discussed in
111. Redzo Mujcic & Paul Frijters, Still Not Allowed on the Bus: It Matters if You're
Black or White! 7-12 (IZA Inst. of Labor Econ., Working Paper No. 7300, 2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2245970 [https://perma.cclJVG8-
PJDS].
112. Id. at tbl.5.
113. See Ian Ayres, Opinion, When Whites Get a Free Pass: Research Shows That White
Privilege Is Real, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/opinion/
research-shows-white-privilege-is-real.html [https://perma.cc/ST8Y-WWHY] (discussing
the study).
114. See Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 425 (discussing studies about
how people identify acceptable criteria to justify their decisions); Michael I. Norton et al.,
Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on
Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 36, 39-41 (2006) (detailing how individuals
manipulate nonracial information to justify decisions that align with their preferences
based on illegitimate factors); Michael I. Norton, John M. Darley & Joseph A. Vandello,
Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 817, 817 (2004)
(discussing casuistry-"specious reasoning in the service of justifying questionable
behavior"-to "cloak" decisions).
115. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection
Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. ScI. 315, 315 (2000) (discussing "aversive racism");
Victor D. Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor Inference of Nondiscrimination:
Moral Credentialing and the Psychological and Legal Licensing of Bias, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 13-14 (2016) (same).
116. See Amy J. C. Cuddy, Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The BIAS Map: Behaviors
from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 631, 631 (2007)
(discussing the BIAS map, which "systematically links discriminatory behavioral
tendencies to the contents of group stereotypes and emotions, as rooted in structural
components of intergroup relations").
117. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 115, at 316-18.
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Part III indicates the possibility that lenders may have
(unknowingly) treated similarly situated churches differently in loan
origination and modification. Interviewed attorneys' and church
leaders' perceptions of why their clients and churches resorted to
reorganization likewise suggest that lenders, on average, may have
treated similarly situated churches inconsistently at these two points
in the life of a church's finances. Additionally, a snapshot of lending
to religious congregations by two creditors that specialize in lending
to churches augments the attorneys' and leaders' perceptions of the
discrepancy in lenders' treatment of churches.
A. Loan Extension
Though data limitations prevent an analysis of the terms of
loans extended to churches,118 interviewed attorneys' observations
about their church clients' loans 19 suggest that the two sub-forms
of statistical discrimination discussed above may help explain why
Black Churches in particular file for Chapter 11: They pay more
for their mortgages than other similarly situated churches. As
linked with car sales and small business loans, lenders may have
assumed that Black Churches' leaders were less able or willing to
search for alternative lenders, 120 or that these pastors simply could
be "suckered" into paying more for the loan.1 21 Lenders also may
have presumed that loans to Black Churches would cost the lender
more over the long term. 122 Lenders thus would charge Black
Churches more for funds than other similarly situated churches.
Of course, because the attorneys represented mainly Black
Churches, they may have been apt to exaggerate lender's "bad"
behaviors toward Black Churches, while being more lenient when
characterizing lenders' treatment of other churches.
118. See infra Part V.D.
119. Qualitative research seeks to "describe and explain persons' experiences,
behaviours, interactions and social contexts" by focusing on a small group of people and
without relying on statistical models. Ellie Fossey et al., Understanding and Evaluating
Qualitative Research, 36 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 717, 717 (2002). Qualitative research
is concerned with "the applicability of [its] findings, based on how the nature and processes
involved in experiences generalize." Id. at 730.
120. See Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 73, at 848-50 ("Testers who indicated higher
costs of search, less sophistication, and a greater need for a car . . . received significantly
worse deals."); supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
121. See Keating, supra note 97, at 708 (discussing the "sucker theory"). This theory
is consistent with research about the effects of "colorism." See supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
122. See Keating, supra note 97, at 707 (discussing a cost-based discrimination
explanation for sellers charging higher prices to members of particular groups); see also
Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 73, at 846 (discussing controlling for cost-based differences
among testers).
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Attorneys openly discussed what they perceived as lender
bias in loan origination. Black Churches were sold balloon, step
increase, and other "weird" mortgages-the equivalent of
subprime loans. 123 Black Churches unnecessarily agreed to
cross-collateralize,124 and were "duped" into loans with interest
rates over the legal rates 125 and other "bad loans . . . where little
to no underwriting was done, where the focus was just on their
rate of return." 126 One attorney went so far as to state that Black
Churches "were targeted by some banks and . .. consultants who
steered them to [certain] banks,"127 even though more than these
couple banks loaned money to churches. That the leadership of a
Black Church could be "duped" into paying more for credit aligns
with a revenue-based explanation of statistical discrimination. 128
Interviewed pastors' discussions of their churches' loans also
reveal costly terms, such as LIBOR-based payments skyrocketing
to "$20,000 a month" on a loan with a balance at the time of the
Chapter 11 filing (and after missing payments) of approximately
$2.2 million.129 Another leader of a Black Church described trying
to meet loan payments of $11,000 a month on a debt of about $1.1
million.130 In contrast, a white church that ultimately filed under
Chapter 11 initially received a loan for $1.7 million with an
interest rate of 1% over LIBOR. The church's pre-bankruptcy
consensual modification from its lender provided for six-months of
interest only payments and then higher (than what the note
initially provided for) interest and principal payments of under
$12,500 per month.1 31
B. Loan Modification
Black Churches with expensive loans would have been
susceptible to experiencing financial problems so severe that they
needed to ask their lenders for accommodations, possibly more
often than churches with other membership demographics. Based
on my interviews, almost all the churches approached their
123. See Interview with Attorney 120, at 6 (Apr. 22, 2014); see also Interview with
Attorney 115, at 2-3 (Apr. 14, 2014).
124. Interview with Attorney 3, at 3 (Apr. 22, 2013).
125. Id. at 3-4.
126. Interview with Attorney 111, at 8 (Apr. 22, 2014).
127. Interview with Attorney 137, at 2 (Apr. 30, 2014).
128. See Keating, supra note 95, at 708 (discussing the "sucker theory").
129. Interview with Leader 56, at 2 (May 10, 2013).
130. Interview with Leader 176, at 2 (Aug. 24, 2015).
131. This information was obtained from bankruptcy court records of Leader 182's
case. This record is not disclosed to preserve interviewee anonymity.
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lenders for help before considering filing for bankruptcy. 132 The
help that pastors asked for included deferment of payments,
forbearance of defaults, and loan modifications. 1 3 3
Importantly, these requests presented lenders with a distinct
decision, the outcome of which seemingly was not dependent on
the original loan terms. As noted, more than half of the religious
organizations' Chapter 11 cases ended in a confirmed
reorganization plan or a consensual resolution. 134 The plans
restructured secured loans and paid unsecured creditors an
average of 65% and a median of 100% of the dollar value of their
claims. 135 These outcomes accord with religious organization
debtors' statements that their real property was worth
significantly more than the amount they owed on it at the time
they filed under Chapter 11.136 Resolutions seemed attainable.
Despite this reality, loan officers may have reacted to the
same "good" and "bad" debtor categorizations that seemed to
motivate consumer bankruptcy attorneys' recommendations to
their hypothetical clients. When leaders from churches with
predominately white membership, who most likely were white
themselves, 37 asked for accommodations, loan officers may have
expected competent pastors to request modifications that were in
their churches' best interests.13 8 When the requests came, loan
officers were ready to grant these pastors and churches one-off
accommodations. 139
Conversely, when leaders from churches with predominately
Black membership, who often were Black themselves, 140
requested similar accommodations, lenders may not have
expected these requests, and perhaps may have seen these
pastors as putting a desire for a "fresh start" above the church's
duty to pay back its debts. 141 Loan officers would have been less
132. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Interview with Leader 55, supra note 16, at 3 ("I asked ... will you
modify our loan, lower the interest rate and maybe cut off some of the principal ....
134. Foohey, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 58; see also supra note 65.
135. Foohey, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 57.
136. Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 9, at 726.
137. See supra note 42.
138. These perceptions align with the BIAS map. See Cuddy, Glick & Fiske, supra note
116, at 632.
139. See Ayres, supra note 113 (noting that "one-off accommodations where the
decision-maker retains substantial discretion don't offer any easy point of comparison").
140. See supra note 42.
141. See Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 416 ("[I]t seems that the
African-American (and race unspecified) couple expresses good values by indicating that
they want to pay back their old debts by filing in Chapter 13."). These perceptions align
with the BIAS map, and accord with how cost-based and revenue-based statistical
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ready and less likely to grant these pastors and churches one-off
accommodations. Taken on average, a consistent pattern
emerges: White consumers are more likely to get a quick,
inexpensive discharge, 142 white passengers get more free bus
rides, 143 and white churches get loan modifications more often
than Black Churches.
Interviewed attorneys' perceptions of how secured creditors
responded to modification requests from Black Churches are
consistent with this hypothesis. In recounting how their Black
Church clients tried to negotiate with lenders before seeking the
attorneys' help, attorneys maintained that consensual resolutions
should have happened in some instances. For example, one
church's mortgage bore a 12% interest rate, and the attorney
thought that the lender "could have adjusted that and still made a
decent return. And the church could have paid it."144 But the
lender apparently was struggling and was "under a lot of pressure
to liquidate some loans. And this was one they chose to
liquidate."145 Another lender seemed "bound and determined, it
wanted to be done with this loan." 14 6 Though in these two cases
attorneys merely hinted at suspect motivations, they clearly
suggested that lenders marked certain loans for liquidation.
Based on attorneys' perceptions, lenders also seemed wary of
dealing with Black Churches absent the procedures and
protections of Chapter 11, even when similar procedures and
protections were possible outside of bankruptcy. One attorney
described trying "to do a workout" with a particular lender on
behalf of a church, but the lender was "plowing forward with
foreclosure."14 7 The lender apparently changed its tune and was
"good to deal with" during the Chapter 11 case, which the attorney
found "surprising" because the workout had failed."148 Similarly,
another attorney had asked contacts about this particular lender's
practices and had come away with the impression that it would
not deal with churches outside of bankruptcy.149
discrimination can manifest in this context. See Cuddy, Glick & Fiske, supra note 116, at
632.
142. See supra Part III.B.
143. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
144. Interview with Attorney 129, at 3-4 (Apr. 24, 2014).
145. Id. at 4.
146. Interview with Attorney 105, at 2, 5 (Apr. 2, 2014); see also Interview with
Attorney 32, at 3 (May 24, 2013) ("[T]he mortgage company was not willing to do
anything.").
147. Interview with Attorney 26, at 3 (May 14, 2013).
148. Id. at 4.
149. Interview with Attorney 17, at 6 (May 2, 2013).
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These attorneys' stories about that lender are consistent with
other attorneys' impressions about different lenders. In short,
though lenders appeared willing to negotiate, they "wanted to
make sure [that] the value [of the churches' buildings] they were
agreeing to was a true value."150 Hiring an appraiser presumably
could have assured the lender, but the lender instead wanted the
appraisal to happen during a bankruptcy proceeding. 151
Attorneys further commented on the value of bankruptcy to
show lenders churches' financial situations. 152 Again, lenders
seemingly could have hired accountants to assess the churches'
finances, or they could have accepted churches' submitted
financial documents. But a court-supervised process became the
requirement for some Black Churches. Of course, some pastors of
Black Churches were unresponsive to their lenders, but these
stories stood out among attorneys' descriptions of what happened
pre-bankruptcy. 153
Lenders' apparent need to use formal proceedings to assess
Black Churches' finances aligns with the expected results of
revenue- and cost-based discrimination. Chapter 11 would force
the churches to produce schedules detailing assets, debts, and
financial affairs, and monthly reports of net income, 154
demonstrating to loan officers what Black Churches could pay
going forward, and whether these churches were hiding or
destroying assets. Chapter 11 also includes procedures that
protect creditors from debtors' tendencies to neglect collateral. 155
These procedures would assure lenders that loans to Black
Churches were not costing more than loans to other churches.
Indeed, some pastors stated that it was their lender who initially
raised Chapter 11 as a possibility. 156
150. Interview with Attorney 109, at 3 (Apr. 8, 2014); see also Interview with Attorney
29, at 3 (May 15, 2013) (noting that "valuation of a church property is very problematic").
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 120, at 3-4 (Apr. 22, 2014); Interview with
Attorney 116, at 3-4 (Apr. 15, 2014); Interview with Attorney 114, at 2 (Apr. 14, 2014);
Interview with Attorney 106, at 3-4 (Apr. 7, 2014).
153. One lender "had been working with the church minister trying to get something
worked out, but then [the minister] never made good on his promises." Interview with
Attorney 118, at 7 (Apr. 17, 2014). Another preacher went to jail for embezzlement and
fraud. Interview with Attorney 101, at 3 (Apr. 4, 2014).
154. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2012).
155. Secured creditors may seek adequate protection payments or a lift of the
automatic stay if they think that the value of their collateral is declining during the
bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d). To the extent that a secured creditor's collateral
transforms into cash, the secured creditor is protected by provisions that require a debtor
to seek a court order to use cash collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c).
156. Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 8, at 1348-49 (summarizing why
churches' attorneys thought lenders might suggest bankruptcy).
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Other attorneys used more direct language. They thought
lenders were "pissed off' that Black Churches were not honoring
their promises. 15 7 Lenders were first to "draw blood," 15 8 were
"witch hunting," 159 and were putting pressure on pastors.160 As
part of the "hunt," one Black Church's lender placed the church in
receivership and then was "trying to find out that [the lead pastor]
did something wrong or that the church did something wrong with
their funds, things like that."16 '
Overall, lenders seemed ready to "foreclose on [the church]
and find another victim." 1 62 For one Black Church, the attorney
believed it did not help that its building was in a neighborhood
that was gentrifying; the creditor wanted the land. 163 As another
attorney summed up: "[S]ometimes if a congregation is very
different from your own and then doesn't do things the way you
think they should do it, it's easier to be unsympathetic."1 64
Though interviewed leaders understandably were looking for
someone to blame, 165 many pastors and other leaders of Black
Churches echoed attorneys' comments that creditors wanted the
buildings and were ready to do anything to get them. 166 A loan
officer purportedly stated: "I'm going to take your building."167
Another leader asserted that its bank "wanted the dirt that we
were sitting on" so it could replace the church with apartments. 68
One interviewed pastor characterized the church's lender as
"relentless," "heartless," and disrespectful. 169 The pastor intimated
that he knew of white churches that supposedly had received
better treatment from the same lender, and hypothesized its
lender was less willing to deal with a Black Church. 170 Other Black
Church leaders' stories of dealing with the same lender align with
157. Interview with Attorney 128, at 5 (Apr. 23, 2014).
158. Interview with Attorney 127, at 3 (Apr. 23, 2014).
159. Interview with Attorney 137, at 2-3 (Apr. 30, 2014).
160. Interview with Attorney 140, at 2 (May 6, 2014).
161. Interview with Attorney 137, at 2-3 (Apr. 30, 2014).
162. Interview with Attorney 25, at 5 (May 13, 2013).
163. Interview with Attorney 114, at 3 (Apr. 14, 2014).
164. Interview with Attorney 111, at 9 (Apr. 14, 2014).
165. See Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 1355-59 (discussing
the mental processes by which consumer debtors and pastors justify filing for bankruptcy).
166. See, e.g., Interview with Leader 52, at 2-3 (May 3, 2013) (hypothesizing that the
bank could sell the property for a $500,000 profit); Interview with Leader 161, at 3 (May 8,
2015) ("They wanted that building, because, I mean, it was a cash cow for them."); Interview
with Leader 169, at 2 (July 1, 2015) ("They wanted the property very, very badly.").
167. Interview with Leader 167, at 3 (June 26, 2015).
168. Interview with Leader 176, at 10 (Aug. 24, 2015).
169. Interview with Leader 55, at 3 (May 6, 2013).
170. Id. at 4.
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this hypothesis. One Black Church never missed a note payment
in ten years, but when the note's balloon came due, the lender
refused to refinance or work with the church. 171 Similarly, the
same lender refused to refinance another Black Church when its
note's balloon came due. The church even offered to pay a higher
interest rate, but the lender refused to settle and instead had "a
sinister motive" and "just hell bent to take the building."172
In contrast, the same lender seemed to work with white
churches. A leader from a white church described receiving two
forbearances from this lender. The church simply could not meet
the twice modified terms and thus filed under Chapter 11.173 Once
in bankruptcy, its lender did not seem intent on taking the
church's property. The lender instead sold the note to an investor
"[e]ssentially as soon as the [Chapter 11] filing took place." 17 4
Straddling these two accounts, a leader of a multiracial
church that had a longstanding relationship with the same lender
acknowledged that "the intent of [the lender] was [not] to do [this
church] harm,"176 but also stated: "We've seen a number of
African-American pastors who have had to step down and lost
their church.. . . And it's almost like predatory kind of lending in
a commercial sense."176 This leader told a story of the lender
experiencing "meteoric growth" by marketing over-collateralized
loans on the secondary market.177 When the Great Recession hit,
the lender's survival strategy was to stop writing new loans and
refused to renew some performing loans.178
This particular lender was not the only lender about which
pastors and other leaders of Black Churches complained.
However, this lender appeared in 5% of the religious
organizations' Chapter 11 cases filed during the study timeframe,
making it the lender that appeared the most often in these cases,
which may explain its frequency among attorneys' and pastors'
comments. 179
Pastors from Black Churches told stories of other lenders
effectively trapping their churches into defaulting. When one pastor
171. Interview with Leader 161, at 1 (May 8, 2015).
172. Interview with Leader 167, at 3, 6 (June 26, 2015).
173. This information was obtained from bankruptcy court records of Leader 182's
case. This record is not disclosed to preserve interviewee anonymity.
174. Interview with Leader 182, at 4 (Aug. 31, 2015).
175. Interview with Leader 171, at 6 (Aug. 6, 2015).
176. Id. at 11.
177. Id. at 1.
178. Id. at 5.
179. This lender extended credit to 32 of the 589 religious organization debtors that
filed schedules. See infra Part IV.C.
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asked for forbearance, the church's lender "gave [the church] a
roadmap of how to do [the forbearance].... They say ... the first
thing we want you to do is to stop paying us monthly .... And then
after about three months, then we will be able to do what it is that
we need to do to help you . . . ."180 After the church defaulted, as told
to do, the bank apparently "took that and used that against [the
church]." 181 When the church tried to catch up on payments, bank
representatives "wouldn't even accept the money." 182 Similarly,
another pastor spoke of the church's lender being so
uncommunicative that the pastor could not get a clear answer about
where to send payments: "[H]ow can you take care of business if we
can't have dialogue?"183 Finally, another pastor simply deemed its
lender "totally cut throat and very, very scummy."1 8 4
In contrast, attorneys' and leaders' stories of how white
churches landed in bankruptcy tell of less bumpy or abrupt paths
to Chapter 11. One white church received a modification
pre-bankruptcy and found another lender to refinance during
Chapter 11.185 Another received a settlement, but did not
perform.186 Yet another white church's bank worked with it for
almost two years before the bank was sold to another bank that
would not refinance.187
White and multiracial churches also seemed to file Chapter
11 to deal with issues unrelated to their lenders more often than
Black Churches. One white church filed to deal with an issue with
a lease, not its lender. 188 Though another white church was behind
on its mortgage, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was the
creditor who pushed the church into Chapter 11.189 Similarly, one
multiracial church filed because it had fallen significantly behind
on payroll tax liabilities, 190 and another multiracial church filed
180. Interview with Leader 176, at 2-3 (Aug. 24, 2015).
181. Id. at 3.
182. Id.
183. Interview with Leader 154, at 2, 6 (Apr. 29, 2015). Some Black Churches ended
up in Chapter 11 because of problems not stemming from their mortgages or encountered
less fraught paths to Chapter 11. See, e.g., Interview with Leader 159, 1-2 (May 7, 2015)
(discussing issues with a contractor); Interview with Leader 184, 1-2 (Sept. 3, 2015)
(describing how Chapter 11 was useful to deal with disparate bondholders).
184. Interview with Leader 169, at 1 (July 1, 2015).
185. Interview with Attorney 102, at 2-3 (Apr. 1, 2014).
186. Interview with Attorney 139, at 3 (Apr. 30, 2014).
187. Interview with Leader 173, at 2, 4 (Aug. 18, 2015).
188. Interview with Attorney 104, at 1-2 (Apr. 2, 2014).
189. Interview with Attorney 113, at 2-3 (Apr. 14, 2014). Another white church was
much larger than most other church debtors; its case resembled a mid-sized business
Chapter 11 case. See Interview with Attorney 122, at 1-3 (Apr. 22, 2014).
190. Interview with Leader 178, at 1-2 (Aug, 25, 2015).
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because of issues with the IRS and a personal property lease. 191 Of
course, some white and multiracial churches faced aggressive
lenders but these stories stood out as outliers.1 92
Though attorneys' and leaders' impressions and stories do not
include those from churches that did not file for bankruptcy,1 93 the
frequency of their comments that mirror why Blacks pay more
across financial transactions provides support for the hypothesis
that lenders may have treated similarly situated churches
differently during loan origination and modification.
C. Snapshot of Church Lending
Attorneys' and pastors' discussion of particular lenders
presents an avenue to assess on a limited basis the actions of
financial institutions that lend to churches. They mentioned two
lenders with notable specificity, which I call "Lender 1" and
"Lender 2" for purposes of anonymity. These two lenders are
among the banks and other institutions that provide financing to
churches nationwide. Considered together, these two lenders
made loans to 9% of the religious organizations that filed during
the study timeframe. 194
A snapshot of these two lenders' extensions of credit to
churches shows that they made loans to churches with a variety of
demographics, and not primarily to Black Churches. Of the ten
"hot" districts which cumulatively oversaw more than 50% of the
religious organization Chapter 11 cases during the study
timeframe,1 95 counties in the Middle and Southern Districts of
Florida have the most accessible real property records.1 96 To take
a snapshot of lending, I searched the real property records in
counties in the Middle and Southern District of Florida by the two
grantees.
191. Interview with Leader 168, at 1-3 (July 1, 2015).
192. See Interview with Leader 174, at 7 (Aug. 21, 2015) (describing a Canadian bank
as "ruthless" and "un-Christian"); Interview with Leader 166, at 4 (June 23, 2015)
(describing how a bank's employees seemed to have "a personal vendetta" against the
church).
193. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
194. Lender 1 extended credit to 32 (5.4%) of the 589 religious organization debtors
that filed schedules. See also supra note 178. Lender 2 extended credit to 23 (3.9%) of the
589 religious organization debtors that filed schedules. Lender 1 extended credit to 29
unique debtors, and Lender 2 extended credit to 21 unique debtors.
195. See supra Figure 1, notes 32-33, and accompanying text.
196. For each district, all but one county's records are online and searchable for free.
See FLORIDA PUBLIC RECORDS DIRECTORY, http://publicrecords.onlinesearches.com/
Florida.htm [https://perma.cc/2JRH-B479]. I took a snapshot of lending in two "hot"
districts to test whether financial institutions are lending to Black Churches more
frequently than to churches with other membership demographics. See infra Part V.D.
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As of March 2015, Lender 1 had loans outstanding to thirty
churches in the Middle District of Florida and seven churches in
the Southern District of Florida. As of March 2015, Lender 2 had
loans outstanding to twenty-three churches in the Middle District
of Florida and eight churches in the Southern District of Florida. 197
As compared in Table 6, the relative membership demographics of
these churches broadly reflect the demographics of the populations
in these two districts.198
Table 6: Demographics of Churches Extended Credit Versus
Middle and Southern District of Florida Population
Lender 1 Lender 2 Lenders 1 + 2 Population
N % N % % N %
White 20 54.1 6 19.4 38.2 9,262,117 54.3
Black 10 27.0 10 32.3 29.4 2,795,616 16.4
Latino 1 2.7 9 29.0 14.7 4,301,164 25.2
Asian 1 2.7 0 0.0 1.5 459,773 2.7
Other 2 5.4 1 3.2 4.4 244,386 1.4
Unclear 3 8.1 5 16.1 11.8 0 0.0
TOTAL 37 100.0 31 100.0 100.0 17,063,056 100.0
The churches with unclear demographics likely account for some
of the disparity between the white population in these two districts
and the percentage of churches with predominately white
membership among these lenders' debtors. 199 The disparity between
Lender 1's and Lender 2's loans to churches with Latino membership
almost certainly stems from Lender's affiliation with a denomination
that has a significant Latino membership. In addition, these two
lenders simply may tend to lend to churches with particular
demographics because of word of mouth, among other reasons.
Overall, though both lenders extended loans to more churches with
predominately Black membership than the percentage of Blacks
living in those two districts, they both provided funding to more
churches with mainly white membership than Black Churches.
Despite extending funds to a variety of churches, both lenders
mostly appeared in Chapter 11 cases filed by Black Churches. Of
197. I searched real property records on March 16, 2015, and March 22, 2015.
198. To identify membership demographics, I relied on pictures online. If I found
pictures of service attendees or of multiple pastors or leaders, all seemingly of a particular
demographic, I so categorized the church. Population demographics are from the 2013
Census, supra note 23. The "Other" category includes multiracial churches and people not
of white, Black, Latino, or Asian descent.
199. As with religious organization Chapter 11 debtors, I was conservative in
categorization. See supra note 42.
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the twenty-nine churches that received credit from Lender 1 that
filed during the study timeframe, 200 twenty-one (72%) were Black
Churches. Another was a Latino church, and only one church
clearly had a majority of white members.201 Lender 1 was the only
creditor secured by real property in twenty-two (76%) of its
debtors' cases. 202 Being the debtor's sole creditor secured by the
building that was the debtor's largest financial consternation and
the property that the debtor most wanted to keep most likely
provided Lender 1 with significant leverage over the debtors prior
to their Chapter 11 filings. 203
Similarly, of the twenty-one churches that received loans from
Lender 2 that filed during the study timeframe, 204 all but one (95%)
were Black Churches. Lender 2 was the only creditor secured by
real property in eighteen (86%) of its debtors' cases.205 Lender 2 thus
also seemingly had leverage over its debtors prior to their filings.
This snapshot suggests that two of the largest organizations
that provide loans to churches lend to a variety of churches, yet
may deal with Black Churches in ways that lead them to file under
Chapter 11 in numbers disproportionate to their incidence in the
church population. Though the universe of churches to which these
two lenders have extended loans necessarily will face differing
financial situations, given that these lenders are filling niche
lending markets, the variation should not be so great that
seemingly only their Black Church clients face circumstances that
lead them to request loan modifications and similar
accommodations from their lenders. Something else is driving
Black Churches into Chapter 11. These case studies add support
to interviewed attorneys' and leaders' comments suggesting that
church lenders' actions during loan origination and modification
plays a part.
D. Consequences of Black Churches Paying More
The result is that Black Churches spent more time and effort
to attain loan modifications. 2 0 6 Along with paying attorneys and
200. See supra note 194.
201. Six churches had unclear membership demographics. See supra note 38.
202. Lender 1 was one of two creditors secured by the debtor's real property in five
cases, and one of three creditors secured by the debtor's real property in two cases.
203. See Foohey, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 53-54 (discussing the power of
creditors secured by almost all of a debtor's assets); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 194.
205. Lender 2 was one of two creditors secured by the debtor's real property in two
cases, and one of three creditors secured by the debtor's real property in one case.
206. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing the outcomes of
religious organization Chapter 11 cases).
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fees and spending time meeting technical requirements, 207 leaders
had to manage the emotional repercussions of their churches'
Chapter 11 cases. Leaders themselves felt ashamed of having to
place their churches in bankruptcy.208 They mentioned how
Chapter 11 was "a big black box," which meant they relied on their
bankruptcy attorneys, which in turn sometimes "create[d] a lot of
anxiety." 209 One pastor discussed not understanding why the
church had to open new bank accounts, and the indignity of having
to go through court security over and over: "I felt like I have to go
to jail or something."210 Another pastor spoke of the "leg work,
information, questioning" that went with the church's Chapter 11
case, stating, "I might even call it interrogation." 211
The Chapter 11 cases likewise impacted congregants, who
required leaders to spend time helping members understand why
filing was necessary. A pastor explained, "from a culture
standpoint, internally, ... to the church psyche, it's not good. It's
just not good. . .. You don't [file for bankruptcy]."212 Another
pastor similarly summed up: "Because people are affected by what
other people say and as try as you may not to let it get spread about
what's going on, people find out and then-what's wrong with you
all, your church, your pastor. So I wouldn't want to have them go
through [bankruptcy] again." 213 In short, Black Churches paid
more-monetarily, time-wise, and emotionally-to be forgiven.
V. EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENON: REJECTING OTHER REASONS
Having identified the actions of churches' creditors as one
potential reason for the high percentage of Black Churches in
Chapter 11, this Part raises and rejects other reasons to explain the
disparity. Data limitations prevent sophisticated statistical analysis.
No source tracks congregations by membership demographics, and
the one source that tracks membership by demographics does not
disaggregate the data by geographic region.214 In addition, a sizable
207. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
208. See Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 8, at 1352-55 (discussing leaders'
statements about stigma and shame).
209. Interview with Leader 56, at 8 (May 10, 2013).
210. Interview with Leader 58, at 6-7 (July 17, 2013).
211. Interview with Leader 180, at 6 (Aug. 27, 2015).
212. Interview with Leader 56, at 9 (May 10, 2013).
213. Interview with Leader 54, at 5 (May 1, 2013).
214. The 2010 Religious Congregation and Membership Study tracks congregations by
denomination and is disaggregated by county and metropolitan area. See U.S.
Congregational Membership: Reports, ASS'N RELIGIOUS DATA ARCHIVES (2010),
http://www.thearda.com/RCMS2010/ [https://perma.cclYW3V-7G5A]; see also supra note 22
and accompanying text. The U.S. Religious Landscape Survey tracks nationwide
[54:51114
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minority of religious organization debtors did not file information
with the bankruptcy courts that specified denomination and
congregation demographics. Many of these churches were not
locatable through Internet searches, or only their denomination was
evident,215 leaving the debtors categorized as "unclear" as to
denomination and demographics. 216 Even so, a less refined
comparison of churches in Chapter 11 to churches across America
shows that often posited reasons why Black Churches in particular
seek to reorganize, considered alone or combined, do not seem to
explain Black Churches' prevalence in Chapter 11.
A. Denomination
Many of the religious organization debtors were
non-denominational and congregationalist churches. 217 These
churches' lack of affiliations with denominations that operate with
more structured governance, 218 and the associated potential
ability to assist member churches when financial problems
arise, 219 may have left these churches with nowhere to turn but
Chapter 11 when their efforts to deal with the financial issues on
their own failed.220 Similarly, when these churches initially sought
funds to purchase or renovate their buildings, they almost
necessarily had to look to external sources, such as banks. 221
Interviewed attorneys identified the independent nature of the
membership in specific denominations by demographics and income. See Religious
Landscape Study, PEW RES. CTR., http://religions.pewforum.org/ [https://perma.cc/H5MR-
JFAM]; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 38, 43.
216. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
217. See supra Table 1, note 38 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
219. See NANCY TATOM AMMERMAN, PILLARS OF FAITH: AMERICAN CONGREGATIONS
AND THEIR PARTNERS 100, 101 tbl.7 (2005) (identifying Mainline Protestant and Catholic
& Orthodox congregations as most likely to receive financial support from their
denominations).
220. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
221. The founder of Foundation Capital Resources, a nationwide lender to churches,
noted "that the approximately 400 active church denomination foundations in this country
can only make loans within their denominations, and they are also often limited to $1
million or $2 million for a loan." Churches Turn to Foundation Capital Resources for Big
Money, MISS. BUS. J. (June 20, 2005), http://msbusiness.com/2005/06/churches-turn-to-
foundation-capital-resources-for-big-money/ [https://perma.cc/GC25-BRUY]. FCR is linked
with the Assemblies of God, a Pentecostal denomination. Found. Capital Res., Securities
Registration Statement (Form S-i/A) F-60 (Oct. 14, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1126506/000090572903000350/fcrslla_101403.htm [https://perma.cc/
PD5C-8REX].The Assemblies of God's website explains, "Each church is sovereign in the
choice of pastor, owning and holding property, ... and voluntary participation in
denominational programs." The Assemblies of God, ASSEMBLIES OF GOD (Nov. 19,2009,4:41
PM), http://ag.org/toplPress/organization.cfm [https://perma.cc/A5S8-JP69].
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majority of their religious organization debtor clients as one of the
primary reasons why they thought these churches relied on
bankruptcy to help with their financial problems. 222
Non-denominational and congregationalist churches also
attract more diverse members. 223 Black Churches may appear
more disproportionately in Chapter 11 because of their affiliations
or lack of affiliation. That their membership is predominately
Black thus may be coincidental. However, data regarding church
demographics contradict this explanation.
Focusing on non-denominational churches, 11% of
non-denominational congregations have predominately Black
membership. 224 In contrast, nearly 80% of the religious organization
debtors that operated non-denominational churches had
predominately Black membership. 225  Considering that
non-denominational churches comprise 11% of Christian
congregations nationwide,226 around 1% of churches nationwide
likely are non-denominational Black Churches. Again in contrast, at
the very least, 31% of the Christian churches that filed under
Chapter 11 during the study timeframe were non-denominational
Black Churches. 227
Of congregationalist denominations, those with more than
a small minority of Black adherents are historically Black
Churches. 228 For instance, Blacks comprise 29% of Baptists
nationwide, but when Baptists are separated according to
evangelical, mainline, and historically Black traditions, it
222. See Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 285-86 (summarizing
why attorneys thought that non-denominational and congregational churches' autonomy
often resulted in the churches' need to turn to Chapter 11).
223. See Scott Thumma, What God Makes Free Is Free Indeed: Nondenominational
Church Identity and Its Networks of Support, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RES. (Oct.
1999), http://hirr.hartsem.edulbookshelf/thumma-article5.html [https://perma.cc/9PHD-
8KJ2] (noting that non-denominational churches have more racially diverse congregations
than denominationally-aligned congregations).
224. See Scott Thumma, 2010 Survey of Independent & Nondenominational Churches,
HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RES. 2 (2010), http://hirr.hartsem.edulcong/2010-Survey-
Independent-Nondenominational-Churches.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6ZA-74EH]. Data regarding
non-denominational congregations comes from a 2010 survey by Faith Communities Today and
other data from the Hartford Institute for Religious Research. See id.; FAITH COMMUNITIES
TODAY, http://faithcommunitiestoday.org/fact-2010 [https://perma.ce/A3EQ-HE8D].
225. 194 of the 243 non-denominational Christian congregation debtors had
predominately Black membership. Supra Table 1.
226. See id.
227. 194 of the 625 Christian churches were non-denominational Black Churches. Id.
This is a conservative estimate. See supra notes 38, 43.
228. See America's Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. 124 (May 12, 2015),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-contentiuploads/sites/11/2015/05/RLS-08-26-full-report.pdf
[https://perma.ccG5QZ-XEAC]. Because of data limitations, in some instances I compare
congregants rather than congregations.
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becomes clear that most Black Baptists worship at historically
Black Churches: 5% of Baptists from the evangelical traditions
are Black, 3% of Baptists from the mainline traditions are
Black, and 97% of Baptists from the historically Black tradition
are Black. 2 2 9 Methodist and Pentecostal churches have similar
divergences among Black and white adherents. 230 The
population of congregationalist Black Churches among Chapter
11 debtors noticeably diverges from the population of Black
congregational churches nationwide.
B. Combination of Location and Denomination
Adding debtors' geographic location to the analysis may
explain the over-representation of Black Churches in Chapter 11.
Non-denominational churches are more prevalent in the South,
and in smaller cities and towns.231 Congregationalist churches
likewise appear more often in the South.232
Many of the churches that filed during the study timeframe
were located in the South.233 The majority of the United States'
Black population also lives in the South.234 The combination of the
most prevalent Christian denominations and racial demographics
of these regions simply may mean that these regions are home to
more Black Churches. But a comparison of the percentage of Black
Churches among all religious congregation debtors in the regions
where large numbers of churches filed to the percentages of Black
Churches among all congregations in these areas does not seem to
explain the preponderance of Black Churches in Chapter 11.
Ten judicial districts received 50% of the religious
organization filings during the study timeframe. 235 The Northern
District of Georgia alone received 10% of total filings. 236 Because
this district received a critical mass of filings for a fuller analysis,
229. Id. at 123.
230. Id.
231. 44% of all non-denominational churches are located in the South. Thumma, supra
note 224, at 1. 31% of non-denominational churches are located in areas with less than
10,000 residents; 24% are located in areas of less than 50,000 residents. Id.
232. The Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB) published
a map which details the largest religious groups in each county. See Maps and Charts for
2010, U.S. RELIGION CENSUS (2010), http://www.rems20lO.org/maps2OlO.php?seldenom
=1999&sel-map%5B%5D=12&confirm=confirm [https://perma.cc/28XW-3C6H].
233. See supra Figure 1.
234. See Sonya Rastogi et al., The Black Population: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 7 (Sept.
2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf [https://perma.ce/AF3N-ZR2S]
("According to the 2010 Census, of all respondents who reported Black alone-or-in-combination,
55% lived in the South, 18% in the Midwest, 17% in the Northeast, and 10% in the West.").
235. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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I discuss it in detail as a case study. A less extensive analysis of
filings in other districts and general comments follow.
1. Northern District of Georgia. Table 7 compares the
denomination and demographics of the sixty-seven religious
congregations that filed under Chapter 11 in the Northern
District of Georgia to congregations in that district.3 7 As
summarized at the bottom of Table 7, 63% of the debtors had
predominately Black membership. It is highly unlikely that 63%
of similar churches in the district are Black Churches.238
Table 7: Affiliations and Demographics of Debtors Operating
Places of Worship Versus Congregations in N.D. Georgia
Debtors Congregations
N Black N Other Total % N %
Nondenominational 28 2 44.8 814 13.7
Baptist-Generic 2 3 7.5 1,795 30.2
Missionary Baptist 1 0 1.5 17 0.3
Church of God in
Christ 8 0 11.9 56 0.9
Apostolic 0 1 1.5 13 0.2
Pentecostal-Generic 1 0 1.5 184 3.1
Churches of Christ 1 0 1.5 226 3.8
United Methodist 1 1 3.0 689 11.6
Orthodox 0 1 1.5 32 0.5
Episcopal 0 1 1.5 71 1.2
Non-Christian 0 1 1.5 189 3.2
Unclear 0 15 22.4 0 0.0
Other Historically
Black 0 0 0.0 293 4.9
Other 0 0 0.0 1,568 26.4
TOTAL
(Demographic %)
42
(62.7%)
25
(37.3%)
100.0 5,947 100.0
237. Table 7 includes every denomination with at least one affiliated debtor. "Other"
includes debtors with unidentifiable demographics. Congregation data are from the 2010
Religious Congregations and Membership Study. See U.S. Congregational Membership:
Reports, supra note 22.
238. Only if every nondenominational, Baptist, Apostolic, Churches of Christ, other
Pentecostal, and historically Black Church in the district were assumed to have
predominately Black membership would the percentage of Black Churches in the district
equal the percentage of Black Church debtors that filed during the study timeframe. See
U.S. Congregational Membership: Reports, supra note 22.
2017] LENDER DISCRIMTNATION 1119
The racial demographics of the Northern District of Georgia
further suggest that Black Churches filed at a higher incidence
than they appear in the relevant population. Focusing solely on
those counties within the Northern District of Georgia where
church debtors were located,239 37% of the population is Black. 240
Black Churches seemingly filed 1.7 times as often as they
appeared in the counties where they operated. 241
Drilling down to the city level, thirteen of the churches that
filed under Chapter 11 during the study timeframe were located
near Atlanta, 242 which has a population that is 54% Black. 24 3 All
thirteen churches were Black Churches. Though most of these
thirteen churches were located in zip codes with predominately
Black populations, ranging from 70% up to 95% Black,244
neighborhoods outside Atlanta with significantly smaller Black
populations still sent only Black Churches to Chapter 11.245 Also,
once the analysis became as granular as comparing at the zip code
level, most of the churches necessarily were located in
predominately Black neighborhoods given that people generally
live and worship segregated by race. 24 6
239. The Northern District of Georgia includes 46 counties. See Northern District of
Georgia Area of Service, U.S. MARSHAL SERVICE, https://www.usmarshals.gov/district/ga-
n/ [https://perma.cc/4E9X-ZMPA]. Religious organizations that filed under Chapter 11
during the study timeframe were from 12 of those counties.
240. The total population of these twelve counties in 2013 was 4,363,768. QuickFacts:
United States, supra note 23. 1,630,818 identified as Black or African American. Id.
241. This calculation uses population demographics as a proxy for congregation
demographics. The exact proportion of Black Churches among all congregations in these
counties thus may be higher or lower than 37%.
242. This calculation excludes one debtor from Atlanta that most likely did not operate
a place of worship, but nonetheless is included in the larger analysis.
243. QuickFacts: Atlanta City, Georgia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045215/1304000 [https://perma.cc/4EYS-GLMW].
244. Demographics based on zip code are from Zip Atlas. The Atlanta zip codes are
30310, 30315, 30331, 30349, and 30354. See Percentage of Blacks (African Americans) in
Atlanta, GA by Zip Code, ZIP ATLAS, http://zipatlas.coml/us/galatlanta/zip-code-comp
arison/percentage-black-population.htm [https://perma.cc/FF2H-GEZH].
245. For example, three non-denominational churches from Marietta, a larger town
twenty miles northwest of Atlanta, filed during the study timeframe. All three churches
had predominately Black congregations, though Marietta's population is 17% Black. See
Marietta, Georgia Zip Code Map & Detailed Profile, ZIP ATLAS, http://zipatlas.com/
us/ga/marietta.htm#race-distribution [https://perma.ccl2CSX-HA8T].
246. See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American
Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. Soc. REV. 629, 630-31 (2010) (detailing the persistent racial
segregation of American neighborhoods); Michael Lipka, Many U.S. Congregations Are Still
Racially Segregated, but Things Are Changing, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2014/12/08/many-u-s-congregations.are-still-racially-segregated-but-
things-are-changing-2/# [https://perma.cc/5QH6-94HP] (noting that 80% of Americans attend
services at congregations where a single racial or ethnic group comprises 80% of the
membership).
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In addition, considering only the Northern District of
Georgia's filings, the disparity between the percentages of
historically Black Churches that filed under Chapter 11 and of
historically Black Churches nationwide remained constant.247 15%
of the religious organization debtors from the Northern District of
Georgia were historically Black Churches, as compared to 6% of
total congregations in the district that are affiliated with
historically Black denominations. 2 4 8 In sum, based on the
Northern District of Georgia, religious organizations' Chapter 11
filings do not seem to be an artifact of the location and
denomination of the debtors.
2. Other "Hot" Districts. Analyses of the nine other "hot"
Chapter 11 filing districts similarly show that the
over-representation of Black Churches in bankruptcy persists
even in the areas where they file most often. The Middle District
of Florida received the second highest percentage of filings during
the study timeframe.249 Black Churches filed over 50% of those
cases.250 In contrast, the population of the counties in the district
from which the church debtors hailed is 15% Black.251 Likewise,
14% of the churches that filed in the district were historically
Black Churches.252 Historically Black Churches comprise 6% of the
congregations located in the district. 253
The disparity persists at the individual county level.
Congregations located in Orange County (which includes the city
of Orlando) filed twelve of the fifty cases. Two-thirds of these
debtors were Black Churches. The population of Orange County is
22% Black.254
Disparities similarly emerge from the analysis of the Central
District of California, which received 6% of total filings during the
247. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Table 7; see also supra note 41 (stating which denominations are
historically Black).
249. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
250. 26 of the 50 debtors were Black Churches.
251. 15 of the Middle District of Florida's 35 counties received filings during the study
timeframe. See Federal Judicial Districts of Florida, U.S. DIST. CT. So. DIST. FIA.,
http://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/?page-id=7850 [https://perma.ccIL8AF-GRNH]. The population of
these counties in 2013 was 8,581,415, and 1,298,706 identified as Black or African American.
QuickFacts- Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST0452
16/12 [https://perma.cc/NPT4-XHfAU].
252. 2 debtors were COGIC and 5 were Missionary Baptist.
253. See U.S. Congregational Membership: Reports, supra note 22.
254. QuickFacts: Orange County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PSTO45216/12095 [https://perma.cc/396P-H3LQ].
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study timeframe. 255 Black Churches accounted for 69% of the
filings in the Central District of California, with churches
affiliated with the COGIC denomination alone filing eleven cases,
which constituted 28% of the filings. 256 Focusing only on those
counties in the district that received filings from COGIC churches,
2% of the congregations are COGIC.2 5 7
Likewise, twelve of the debtors came from Los Angeles. Ten
of the debtors were Black Churches. The zip codes where these ten
churches were located have Black populations ranging from 6% to
78% of residents. 258 The same holds true for other judicial districts
and major metropolitan areas where religious organizations filed
a relatively large number of cases during the study timeframe. 259
Black Churches' Chapter 11 filings seem geographically sporadic.
3. Black Churches from White Districts. Black Churches
that filed Chapter 11 also hailed from areas with heavily white
populations and with a mix of churches that included fewer
non-denominational and congregationalist churches than the ten
"hot" districts. For instance, four churches from the Western
District of Oklahoma filed during the study timeframe. They were
all Black Churches. Oklahoma's population is 7% Black.260 The
largest city in the district, Oklahoma City, where three of these
debtors came from, has a 15% Black population. 261
The reverse of the observation that mainly white districts
often send only Black Churches to Chapter 11-that relatively few
255. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
256. 27 of the 39 debtors were Black Churches, 11 of which were COGIC.
257. The counties are Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Bernardino. U.S.
Congregational Membership: Reports, supra note 22.
258. The Los Angeles zip codes are 90003, 90007, 90008, 90019, 90047, 90057, 90061,
and 90062. See Zip Codes with the Highest Percentage of Blacks (African Americans) in
California, ZIP ATLAS, http://zipatlas.com/us/ca/zip-code-comparison/percentage-black-
population.htm [https://perma.cc/W5GL-VKZD].
259. For example, Houston has a large Hispanic population-44% of residents. 2013
Census, supra note 23. QuickFacts: Houston City, Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/4835000 [https://perma.cc/7QVH-R6T
S] (Mar. 25, 2017). 24% of Houston's residents are Black. Id. Yet of the 9 churches from
Houston that filed during the study timeframe, 7 were Black Churches. Likewise, the
Western District of Tennessee received 29 cases filed by places of worship. All but one
debtor was located within the Memphis city limits. Of the 29 debtors, 25 (86%) were Black
Churches. Memphis's residents are 63% Black. QuickFacts: Memphis City, Tennessee, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/4748000,4835000
[https://perma.cc/4WXVM-74UQ].
260. QuickFacts: Oklahoma, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045216/40,4748000,4835000 [https://perma.cc/4GT3-XJGS].
261. QuickFacts: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.cen
sus.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/4055000,40,4748000,4835000 [https://perma.cc/JA68-8X
2D]. As another example, nine churches filed in the Southern District of Indiana during the
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Black Churches from areas with similar disparities in racial and
denominational demographics as the "hot" districts file-also
holds true. For example, Birmingham, Alabama, and Jackson,
Mississippi are home to some of the largest Black populations in
the United States.262 Their residents also tend to worship at
historically Black Churches and Baptist-affiliated churches more
so than in other areas of the country.263 If churches were filing
under Chapter 11 because of a combination of demographics and
denomination, Black Church filings should be prevalent in these
districts. But the county containing Birmingham received one
filing from a religious organization during the study timeframe. 264
Mississippi received two filings, both of Black Churches, during
the study timeframe. 265 Both debtors came from areas with
majority white populations. 266
Overall, Black Church debtors hailed from districts across the
country, including those with predominately white populations. 267
study timeframe. Seven of the debtors had predominately Black membership. The Black
Church debtors came from cities (Anderson, Indianapolis, and Westfield) with Black
populations ranging from 2% to 28%. QuickFacts: Anderson, Indiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/1801468,1836003,00 [https://perma.cc/2
8G7-BT5F]; QuickFacts: Indianapolis, Indiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/1836003,00 [https://perma.cc/4K72-EWNJ];
QuickFacts: Anderson, Indiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quick
facts/table/PST045216/1882700,1801468,1836003,00 [https://perma.cc/68HN-57DU].
262. Birmingham's population is 73.4% Black; Jackson's population is 79.4% Black.
QuickFacts: Birmingham, Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045216/0107000,1882700,1801468,1836003,00 [https://perma.cc/FDY
9-BCM3]; QuickFacts: Jackson City, Mississippi, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/2836000,0107000,1882700,1801468,1836003
,00 [https://perma.cc/N9UN-QE3T].
263. Historically Black Churches account for 14% of the religious organizations in the
Birmingham metro area and 18% in the Jackson metro area. Baptist-affiliated churches,
excluding those from historically Black denominations account for 41% of the. religious
organizations in the Birmingham area and 33.5% in the Jackson area. See Birmingham-Hoover,
AL Metro-Area Membership Report, AsS'N RELIGIOUS DATA ARCHIVES (2010),
http://www.thearda.com/rcms2010/r/m/13820/rcms2010_13820_metroname.2010.asp [https://
perma.ccBCE7-AGZJ]; Jackson, MS Metro-Area Membership Report, AsS'N RELIGIOUS DATA
ARCHIVES (2010), http://www.thearda.com/rems2010/r/m/27140/rcms2010_27140_metro-name
.2010.asp [https://perma.cc/ZS8K-RZV6]; supra Table 1.
264. Voluntary Petition, In re New Generation Christian Ministry Church, Inc., No.
08-04630-TOM11 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Sept. 18, 2008).
265. Voluntary Petition, In re New Beginning Outreach Ministries, Inc., No. 12-14313
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. Oct. 10, 2012); Voluntary Petition, In re Hillside Baptist Church, Inc.,
No. 09-51541 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. July 22, 2009).
266. One debtor came from Harrison County, which has a 22.1% Black population.
QuickFacts: Harrison County, Mississippi, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045216/28047,00 [https://perma.ce/GDB4-ZT6V]. The other debtor
came from Grenada County, which has 41.7% Black population. QuickFacts: Grenada
County, Mississippi, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045216/28043,28047,00#headnote-js-a [https://perma.cc/XYR9-2PTV].
267. This in further evident in that 65% of the religious organizations that filed in the
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The location of the debtors, even when combined with
denomination, does not seem to explain the preponderance of
Black Churches in Chapter 11. Other factors must have
contributed to these churches' heightened tendency to seek to
reorganize.
C. Congregants'Financial Resources
Another reason for Black Churches' over-representation in
Chapter 11 is that their members have less income and wealth
than the members of churches with other demographics. Many of
the churches that filed for bankruptcy cited the 2008 economic
downturn as the main reason why they could not meet their
financial obligations.268 Socioeconomics also divide churches
across the United States. 269 Some denominations' adherents are
better off financially, both in terms of yearly income and
accumulated wealth. 270 Because churches' revenue mostly comes
from donations from congregants, if members make little money,
they will be less able to contribute to their churches, particularly
during economic crises.271 Likewise, if a church's members own few
assets (and thus have little wealth), if that church encounters
severe financial problems, it is less likely that there will be a
member (or a few members) ready and able to contribute a
sufficiently large sum of money to rescue the church.
Given that Blacks are socio-economically disadvantaged and
tend to worship together,272 Black Churches logically may be more
ten "hot" districts were Black Churches.
268. Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 9, at 757-58.
269. See Ralph E. Pyle, Trends in Religious Stratification: Have Religious Group
Socioeconomic Distinctions Declined in Recent Decades?, 67 Soc. RELIGION 61, 67 (2006)
(concluding that the socio-economic stratification of religious groups did not decline
significantly from 1972-2000); Christian Smith & Robert Faris, Socioeconomic Inequality
in the American Religious System: An Update and Assessment, 44 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION
95, 96 (2005) ("The system of socioeconomic inequality that characterized American religion
at the end of the 20th century reflects a high degree of stability in reproducing itself over
the years .... ).
270. See Evelyn L. Lehrer, Religion As a Determinant of Economic and Demographic
Behavior in the United States, 30 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 707, 714-17 (2004) [hereinafter
Lehrer, Religion as Economic Determinant] (discussing studies); Evelyn L. Lehrer, Religion
As a Determinant of Educational Attainment: An Economic Perspective, 28 SOC. Scl. RES.
358, 374 (1999) (finding that educational attainment is highest among adherents to
Judaism and lowest among fundamentalist Protestants, with Catholics' and mainline
Protestants' educational attainment in the middle); Sam Reimer, Class and Congregations:
Class and Religious Affiliation at the Congregational Level of Analysis, 46 J. SCI. STUD.
RELIGION 583, 588-90 (2007) (analyzing class effects at the congregational level); Smith &
Faris, supra note 269, at 96-102 (tracking educational, income, and status stratification by
religious groups).
271. When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 296-97 & n.133.
272. See Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial,
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susceptible to experiencing financial distress when their members
face financial distress themselves. However, churches with
primarily white congregations are socio-economically stratified 273
and thus also are susceptible to their members' financial
circumstances. Data regarding the incomes of churchgoers across
congregationalist Christian denominations show that Black
Churches' members are not alone in making little money, though
historically Black denominations' members are less well off as
compared to congregationalist churches with predominately white
membership. 274 Indeed, assuming a linear relationship between a
congregation's financial resources and bankruptcy filings, the
ratio of the median income of Black households to non-Hispanic
white households and the ratio of the percentage of members of
predominately Black congregations to predominately white
congregations who make below $30,000 per year, suggest that
Black Churches should file under Chapter 11 about twice as often
as churches with other demographics, not fifteen times. 2 7 5
The relative economic disadvantage of Black churchgoers
may explain in part why churches with predominately Black
membership file under Chapter 11 more so than other churches.
However, the size of the disparity in the numbers of Black
Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/ [https://perma
.cc/B7YS-ZZMS] ("The wealth of white households was 13 times the median wealth of Black
households in 2013, compared with eight times the wealth in 2010... ."); Carmen
DeNavas-Walt & Bernadette D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2013,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 7 (2014), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E88-USB4] ('The median income
for non-Hispanic White households was $58,270, and it was $34,598 for Black
households."); supra note 246 and accompanying text.
273. See Lehrer, Religion as Economic Determinant, supra note 270, at 722 (noting
that studies of socio-economic stratification across religious groups primarily focus on
non-Hispanic whites).
274. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY
78-80 (2008), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/05/report-religious-landscape-study-
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9Y2-LKKY]. For instance, based on data from 2008, half of
congregants affiliated with historically Black Baptist churches made less than $30,000. Id.
at 79. A slightly lower 44% of members of Baptist churches from the mainline tradition
made less than $30,000. Id.
275. The median household income ratio is 1.7 to 1. See Walt & Proctor, supra note
272, at 7. With respect to the percentage of congregants who make below $30,000 per year,
the ratio is 1.14 to 1. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, supra note 274, 137-39.
Though these ratios suggest that Black households on average are significantly less well-
off than white households, the difference in magnitude as compared to religious
congregation Chapter 11 filing ratios suggests that there must be a very strong non-linear
effect for the disparity in Black Churches' filings to be explained fully by income. Of course,
income data cannot account for the possibility that individual members of white churches
are more likely to have sufficient wealth to rescue their congregations from financial
troubles.
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Churches that sought to reorganize as compared to their
incidence in the population of congregations suggests that
congregant income and wealth alone may not fully explain the
disparity. There are thousands of similar congregations with
predominately white membership located in equally
impoverished areas across the United States that did file Chapter
11.276
D. Church Finances
Black Churches may finance the purchase, building, or
renovation of their buildings with loans much more frequently
than churches with other membership demographics. If Black
Churches turn to secured lending more often than other
churches, then they would appear more often among religious
organization debtors. Unfortunately, reasonably accessible data
regarding nationwide lending to religious organizations is not
available.
Given that religious organization debtors' debts primarily are
secured by their buildings, 277 real property records may be the
most reliable method to assess which churches deal with banks
and other lending institutions to finance their properties. These
records should contain information regarding the financing of the
properties. An accurate comparison of churches in Chapter 11 to
churches in the population overall thus would require a
comprehensive list of all churches in a specific area. However,
churches are difficult to locate and no source lists all the religious
organizations operating nationwide or in specific areas. 278 In
addition, though some counties maintain searchable real property
276. One study found that class effects are stronger at the congregational level, and
that the location of the congregation plays a key role in the socio-economic status of
members. See Reimer, supra note 270, at 590-91. A corollary reason for the predominance
of Black Churches in Chapter 11 may be that these churches were located in areas that
experienced population shifts, making them more susceptible to economic fluctuations or
decreasing membership. Population shifts are location specific. This explanation thus
should be rejected for the same reasons that members' incomes as driving the predominance
of Black Churches in Chapter 11 should be rejected.
277. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
278. One potential place to look for a list of all religious organizations is the IRS.
However, the IRS often automatically grants religious organizations tax-exempt status,
and does not require churches and certain other faith-based institutions to file tax returns.
See IRS, PUBLICATION 1828 (REV. 8-2015), TAx GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 3, 22 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl828.pdf
[https://perma.ccl7U4C-7EGE]. The ASARB's studies are the most comprehensive sources
of religious organizations, but they do not contain lists of the names of religious
organizations. See U.S. Congregational Membership: Reports, supra note 22. Remaining
sources are the White or Yellow Pages, which may contain non-random gaps in listings, and
the use of which would require manual compilation of a church list.
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records online, counties in many states do not provide online
access to these records.279 The logistics of this analysis make it
infeasible at this time.
Nonetheless, a number of nationwide lending institutions
appeared as secured creditors in a sizable portion of the religious
organizations' Chapter 11 cases. This presents an opportunity to
analyze some of these lenders' loans. As detailed in the previous
part, a Middle and Southern District of Florida specific snapshot
of two lenders reveals that they extend credit to a mix of churches
based on members' demographics. 2 80
This snapshot suggests that financial institutions are not
lending to Black Churches significantly more frequently than to
churches with different demographics. Indeed, these two
institutions' most common debtors were white churches.281 A
variety of churches seem to finance the purchase, building, or
renovation of their buildings with loans.
E. Internal Governance
Despite data limitations, it is possible to roughly compare
churches in Chapter 11 to churches across the country based on
denomination, location, and membership income and wealth.
Likewise, the snapshot of two financial institutions' loans
presented above suggests that a variety of churches turn to lenders
for funds. Other potential explanations for why Black Churches in
particular file under Chapter 11 that are harder to analyze relate
to the beliefs and actions of leaders and members.
First, as raised in the context of consumer bankruptcy
filings, 282 one may speculate that leaders and members of Black
Churches may view filing under Chapter 11 less negatively than
leaders and members of other churches. Other churches may
self-select out of Chapter 11, electing to close rather than file.
However, the tenets of most religions emphasize the importance of
repaying debts and counsel against filing for bankruptcy. 283
Interviewed leaders, almost all of whom were from Black
279. For instance, ten of the nineteen counties in the Western District of Tennessee do
not maintain real property records that are searchable online.
280. See supra Part IV.C.
281. See supra Table 6.
282. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 634-35.
283. See Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV.
141, 167 (1998) ("Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Hinduism clearly foster in their
believers a moral code that emphasizes the importance of debt repayment, and hence, the
avoidance of bankruptcy at all costs.").
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Churches, 284 and interviewed attorneys confirmed that pastors
approached their lenders for assistance prior to filing under
Chapter 11, filing only as a last resort. 285 Leaders also expressed
stigma and shame related to their decisions to file, saying that
bankruptcy was "the end of the world ... the end of your
worthiness." 28 6 Leaders of Black Churches feel guilty about filing.
Other speculations focus more on the actions of leaders and
members. It may be assumed that pastors of Black Churches have
a distinct leadership style that may put their churches in greater
financial peril. Though little research about leadership styles
across denominations exists,287 attorneys commented that their
Black Church clients seemed to give their pastors free reign to
manage the congregation. 2 8 8 A study regarding churches with
smaller membership similarly noted that "black congregations
frequently are strongly pastor-centered." 289 The theory seems to be
that leaders of pastor-centric churches have more autonomy,
which itself could lead to mismanagement.
Relatedly, one may speculate that pastors of Black Churches
may have emphasized contributing less than pastors of other
churches. Their members thus may have been less prepared to use
their own funds to help the congregation, even if they had sufficient
funds, rendering these churches more likely to file for bankruptcy.
In addition, possibly at the behest of their members, pastors of
Black Churches may have used church funds to help congregants
and the surrounding community rather than to pay the church's
mortgage, even after the church fell behind on its debts.
Along with this premise, one may further speculate that
pastors of Black Churches may be less experienced, business savvy,
or financially literate as compared to leaders of other churches. One
likewise may speculate that leaders of Black Churches may be less
likely to have access to financial advisors or lawyers when taking
284. See supra Table 5.
285. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
286. Interview with Leader 55, at 5 (May 6, 2013); see also Foohey, When Faith Falls
Short, supra note 8, at 1352-55 (discussing stigma and shame).
287. Studies of pastor leadership link problems to church decline in general, or discuss
leadership style across types of churches based on the number of members, but do not
discuss membership or leader demographics. See, e.g., ALICE MANN, THE IN-BETWEEN
CHURCH: NAVIGATING SIZE TRANSITIONS IN CONGREGATIONS (1998); ANTHONY G. PAPPAS,
ENTERING THE WORLD OF THE SMALL CHURCH (2000); LYLE E. SCHALLER, A MAINLINE
TURNAROUND: STRATEGIES FOR CONGREGATIONS AND DENOMINATIONS (2005).
288. Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 29, at 285-87.
289. LYLE E. SCHALLER, THE SMALL CHURCH IS DIFFERENT! 29 (1982). A "small church"
is defined as a church with fewer than 100 members. See Small but Mighty, U.S.
CONGREGATIONAL LIFE SURVEY (2014), http://www.uscongregations.orgfblog/2014/02/17/
small-but-mighty/ [https://perma.cc/H4MB-FHLF].
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out or renegotiating their churches' loans. A similar assertion that
Black debtors may be less financially literate and thus more likely
to choose to file under the more expensive and time-consuming
Chapter 13 was raised (and rejected) in connection with attorneys
steering consumer debtors to disparate bankruptcy chapters.290
Financial literacy is a significant issue, and studies suggest that
Blacks are less financially sophisticated than whites, which may
lend some credence to the speculation that pastors of Black
Churches may behave differently.291
These speculations ultimately seem unsatisfactory. Because
of the high proportion of Black Churches as compared to other
Christian churches that filed for Chapter 11, attorneys interacted
with a skewed population of churches, making it unclear whether
their observations are generalizable. 2 9 2 Smaller churches in
general tend to adopt a pastor-centric model.293 Black Churches
are not the only churches with small congregations. 2 9 4 Other small
churches with different membership demographics may employ a
similar leadership structure that allows their pastors to manage
the churches in the same dynamic style linked with predominately
Black congregations-if these speculations about leaders and
members even have a basis in fact.
Pinning the predominance of Black Churches in Chapter 11 on
the supposition that pastors of Black Churches merely ask their
members for money less often, feel pressured to allocate funds in a
certain way, have less experience, are less financially savvy, or do
not employ financial advisors when taking out or renegotiating
loans also contradicts studies of churches located across the
country. These studies find that many churches are adapting to
changing economics and membership demands by altering their
worshiping style.2 9 5  The average age of pastors of
non-denominational churches nationwide is fifty-five years old and
the majority has obtained at least a college bachelor's degree. 296
290. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 635-36.
291. See id. at 636-37 (discussing financial literacy).
292. See supra Table 4.
293. See SCHALLER, supra note 289, at 29.
294. See Small but Mighty, supra note 289 (finding that "56 percent of congregations
average fewer than 100 people in worship"); cf. Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra
note 29, at 288 (noting that scholars have suggested that a church's size may limit its
sustainability and growth).
295. See generally David R. Roozen, A Decade of Change in American Congregations
2000-2010, FAITH COMMUNITIEs TODAY (2011), http://faithcommunitiestoday.org/sites/
default/files/Decade%20of%20Change%20Final O.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T5C-TDWQ]. See
also Thumma, supra note 224, at 1 (detailing changes in worship style among
non-denominational churches from 2005 to 2010).
296. See Thumma, supra note 224, at 5.
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My interviews confirm that there likely are no salient
differences between Black Churches' leadership and other similar
churches' leadership. Most of the churches represented by
interviewed attorneys found their bankruptcy counsel via referrals
from their financial advisors or from other pastors and church
members. 297 Pastors also spoke of seeking advice about their
churches' financial problems from members with professional
backgrounds, including attorneys and underwriters, 2 9 8 or
otherwise having "been in the business world."299 Further, even if
churches with other demographics are more apt to involve
financial advisors during their loan negotiations, Black Church
leaders' lack of outside assistance most likely would have
amplified lenders' biases. This would have led loan officers to
charge Black Churches more for loans or not to agree to
modifications for the reasons linked with revenue- and cost-based
discrimination, and not because Black Churches' finances dictated
different terms.300
Overall, there is little reason to suspect that pastors of Black
Churches are younger, less educated, noticeably less financially
literate, 301 or lead their congregations in a style that is markedly
dissimilar than other pastors. In the end, these suspicions smack
of baseless stereotyping. The question remains, why do Black
Churches file under Chapter 11 so often?
F. Racial Exposure and Paternalism
Loan officers' beliefs likewise may be supposed to have
contributed to the predominance of Black Churches in Chapter 11.
In the context of bankruptcy attorneys seemingly steering
consumer debtors, "racial exposure" and paternalism were raised
(and rejected) as explanations for the discrepancy. 302 Once
analyzed, it becomes clear that these two suppositions relate to loan
officers' biases that have the potential to cause discrimination.
297. Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 8, at 1349-52 (discussing how social
networking led pastors and other church leaders to their bankruptcy attorneys).
298. See, e.g., Interview with Leader 56, at 3 (May 10, 2013) ("I had a key guy that
deals with loss mitigation."); Interview with Leader 52, at 2 (Mar. 17, 2014) ("I have an
attorney on my board. . . .").
299. Interview with Leader 58, at 4 (July 17, 2013).
300. See Ayres, supra note 73, at 842-45.
301. If leaders were noticeably financially illiterate, this illiteracy also most likely
would have enhanced lenders' biases. Lenders would have seen pastors from whom they
could extract revenue-generating concessions. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note
85, at 636-38 (discussing how financial literacy appears to be less sophisticated for Black
consumer debtors than white consumer debtors).
302. See id. at 631-33.
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First, arguments about racial diversity assume that bias will
decrease if people have more contact with people from different
racial groups. 303 This outcome is consistent with the intergroup
contact theory, which posits that contact between races leads to a
reduction in intergroup prejudice. 304 The hypothesis here would be
that loan officers' "racial exposure" may have influenced how they
viewed Black Churches that requested loan modifications or
initially applied for loans.
Thus, analyzing the population demographics in the judicial
districts where Black Churches filed under Chapter 11 may
explain why so many Black Churches file. However, Black
Churches come from across the country, including areas with
relatively large Black populations, large Hispanic populations,
and predominately white populations.305 If "racial exposure" was a
key factor, Black Churches that filed under Chapter 11 seemingly
should have been disbursed differently. Instead, the situations of
Black Churches applying for loans or asking for modifications
seem more likely to elicit discrimination.30 6
Second, it is possible that loan officers refused to negotiate
with Black Churches or directed Black Churches to think about
bankruptcy out of a sense of paternalism-a belief that forcing
these churches to struggle to pull themselves up "by their
bootstraps" would benefit them.30 7 Though loan officers genuinely
may have believed that these outcomes were better for Black
Churches, if loan officers expressed such paternalistic tendencies,
these tendencies seemingly would have stemmed from
discrimination. 30 8 If they did not, more churches with other
membership demographics should have appeared among religious
organization Chapter 11 debtors because loan officers would have
imposed the same paternalistic "bootstrapping" requirement on all
churches. Again, other, more convincing reasons must exist to
explain the phenomenon of Black Churches in Chapter 11.
303. See id. at 631-32 (discussing studies regarding "racial exposure").
304. See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006). See generally Thomas
F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 65 (1998).
305. See supra Part V.B.
306. See Pettigrew & Tropp supra note 304, at 80 (summarizing how "individual
differences and societal norms shape intergroup contact effects").
307. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 632-33 (discussing
paternalism).
308. A belief that it is better (and necessary) for Black Churches to help themselves is
consistent with the BIAS map, which would predict that loan officers would refrain from
taking actions to help Black Churches. See Cuddy et al., supra note 116, at 632.
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VI. LEGAL AND SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Legal Solutions
Interviewed attorneys' and leaders' perceptions of why Black
Churches turned to Chapter 11 align with prior research linking
racial discrimination with Blacks paying more than similarly
situated whites for cars, consumer goods and credit, home loans,
and small business credit. Whenever studies uncover
discrimination in financial transactions, the next step is to analyze
if existing laws addressing discrimination apply to the freshly
exposed instance of discriminatory practices. In the case of Black
Churches turning to Chapter 11 possibly because of disparities in
treatment by lenders, these legal actions, most importantly, may
allow for the discovery of more robust quantitative data to assess
whether lenders' behavior during loan origination and
modification is actually linked with Black Churches in particular
seeking to reorganize.
Two laws often turned to are 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982,
which prohibit racial discrimination in contracting and the sale
of real and personal property.309 Under §§ 1981 and 1982, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff and caused the
plaintiff identifiable injury.310 Though only disparate treatment
claims, and not disparate impact claims, are cognizable under
these sections, the "totality of the circumstances" test allows
intent to discriminate to be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, such as evidence that similarly situated others outside
of the protected class received systematically better treatment.311
If the plaintiff meets this initial burden of proof, then the
defendant must show a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason"
for its actions. 312
309. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2012).
310. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (holding that
§ 1981 prohibits racially motivated refusals to contract and offers to enter into contracts
only upon discriminatory terms); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pa. United Eng'rs &
Constructors, Inc., 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (defining the elements of a § 1981 claim).
311. See Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 73, at 857-63 (discussing the burden shifting
and technical aspects of disparate treatment); Jason Hernandez, Comment, Loan
Discrimination at the Auto Dealership: Current Cases, Strategies and the Case for
Intervention by Attorneys General 9-10, http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/mi
crosites/careerservices/Loan%20Discrimination%2At%2OThe%2OAuto%2ODealership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HR4G-N2A4] (discussing the viability of claims under §§ 1981 and 1982).
312. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (articulating the
burden shifting framework for alleging non-facially discriminatory claims under Title VII);
Hotlzman v. World Book Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 251, 258 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that § 1981
claims follow the same legal framework as Title VII claims).
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Analogizing to Blacks paying more for goods and credit,313 if
lender behavior is a contributing factor in the prevalence of Black
Churches seeking to reorganize, unconscious statistical
discrimination, not overt animus, most likely led to Black Churches
paying more for loans and not receiving modifications. 3 1 4 Black
Churches likely would face obstacles to presenting, let alone winning,
claims under §§ 1981 and 1982-chief among them, proving the
race-conscious conduct necessary to prevail.315 Nonetheless, and
perhaps more importantly in this context, the requirements for
sustaining claims are not insurmountable given the ability to use a
combination of direct and circumstantial evidence to demonstrate
disparate treatment.
The most crucial step would be for a plaintiff to set forth
sufficient factual allegations of a disparity in lenders' treatment of
churches to survive a motion to dismiss. 316 At that point, discovery
would allow for the analysis of loan-level data to which I do not
have access. This data is necessary to assess whether attorneys'
and leaders' perceptions of church lenders align with what truly is
happening, on average, in the context of lending to churches.
Another existing law that could allow for such discovery is an
action under Fair Housing Act (FHA).3 17 Importantly, an action
under the FHA may be more likely to survive to the discovery stage
because, as recently held by the U.S. Supreme Court, disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. 3 1 8 The FHA prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race (among other protected classes)
in the purchase, renting, or financing of "dwellings," 3 19 the
definition of which includes residential real property and other
property where persons reside for extended periods of time. 320
Though Black Churches' places of worship are not "dwellings,"
some lenders extended financing for multiple buildings, including
private residences, all rolled into one loan.3 2 1 These loans
seemingly would come under the purview of the FHA. In these
instances, Black Churches would need to establish disparate
313. See supra Part III.C.
314. See Keating, supra note 97, at 704 (noting "that conscious racial animus on the
part of those discriminating is unlikely to explain the racially disparate effects ... found").
315. See Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 73, at 860-63 (discussing §§ 1981 and 1982's
potential application in the "fair driving" context).
316. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009).
317. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2012).
318. See Tex. Dep't. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
319. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3605(a).
320. Id. § 3602(b) (defining "dwelling).
321. Foohey, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 54.
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impact, and not disparate treatment, to sustain an action based on
their lenders' practices in loan origination and modification.322
Likewise, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 32 3 allows
for claims based on disparate impact. 324 The ECOA makes it
"unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant,
with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction" on the basis of
race (among other protected classifications). 32 5 A church's lender
meets the definition of a "creditor,"326 the church meets the
definition of an "applicant," 327 and the ECOA applies to all stages
of the lending relationship. 3 2 8 Regulation B interprets the ECOA
as prohibiting practices that have the effect of discrimination
based on outcomes-that is, disparate impact. 329
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act provides that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) have
jurisdiction to enforce the ECOA.3 30 Recently the DOJ brought and
settled several high-profile cases against banks under the ECOA
for discrimination against minority borrowers based on disparate
impact. 331 The DOJ could bring similar cases against lending
institutions based on their origination or modification practices. 332
322. Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffery L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage
Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 375, 413 & n.202
(2010).
323. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f.
324. CFPB, Consumer Laws and Regulations: Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) 1 (June 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/fl201306_cfpblaws-and-regu
lationsecoa-combined-june-2013.pdf.
325. Id. § 1691.
326. Id. § 1691(a).
327. Id.
328. See CFPB, CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS: EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
(ECOA) 1-2 (June 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-and-
regulations ecoa-combined-june-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJF2-T7HX].
329. See Official Staff Interpretations, Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, Supp. I,
§ 202.6(a) (2009); CFPB, supra note 328, at 1 (describing the ECOA as having "two principal
theories of liability: disparate treatment and disparate impact"); see also Cherry v. Amoco
Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that plaintiffs may state an ECOA
claim based on the "effects test").
330. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code);
Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department and Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Pledge to Work Together to Protect Consumers from Credit
Discrimination (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/justice-department-and-con
sumer-financial-protection-bureau-pledge-work-together-protect [https://perma.cc/C5HR-
97YV].
331. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1283, 1302 (2014) (discussing these high-profile cases).
332. Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department and
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Pledge to Work Together to Protect Consumers
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In addition, the ECOA provides a private cause of action for
actual and punitive damages of up to $10,000, along with attorneys'
fees in successful actions.333 Black Churches individually could
bring ECOA claims against their lenders. As with actions brought
under §§ 1981 and 1982 and the FHA, if an agency or private action
under the ECOA is to succeed, the plaintiff will need to proffer
evidence that demonstrates disparate impact sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss and allow for discovery.
Of note, however, even if these legal actions result in discovery
of loan-level data, analysis of that data presents methodological
challenges that make it difficult to disentangle discrimination from
other legitimate business factors that may impact lending
relationships. 334 Primarily because of the challenges in proving
disparate impact, plaintiffs ECOA success rate has been mixed.335
But with the right evidence, the ECOA and FHA in particular seem
to offer two solid legal options first to identity and then address this
potential instance of discrimination.
Finally, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) 3 3 6
may provide a legal hook to encourage some lenders to examine
their practices. The CRA was enacted to prevent redlining and
clarify a "long-standing expectation" that banks and thrifts will
serve the needs of their communities, including low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals. 337 It empowers
federal banking agencies (Office of Comptroller of the Currency,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Federal
Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC)) to periodically examine and
rate FDIC-insured depository institutions on their performance
meeting the credit needs of their entire communities, including
through their small-business and community-lending
from Credit Discrimination (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-dep
artment-and-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-pledge-work-together-protect
[https://perma.cc/C5HR-97YV].
333. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (2012).
334. See Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating
"Haves"from "Have-Nots", 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1445-47 (discussing difficulties in
establishing disparate impact under the ECOA when defendants may hide discriminatory
practices under the guise of "business justifications"); Schwemm & Taren, supra note 322,
at 406-07 (detailing how "discretionary pricing" impacts plaintiffs' ability to prove
disparate impact in mortgage lending under the FHA).
335. See 1 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW
§§ 3.1, 3.7 (2011).
336. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908.
337. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
ACT 1 (Mar. 2014), http://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/fact-sheets/
fact-sheet-cra-reinvestment-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY9E.NMSX]; see also Michael S.
Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 513, 516-17 (2005) (discussing the history of the CRA).
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programs. 338 The CRA directs these agencies to "assess the
institution's record" in this regard and to "take such record into
account" in evaluating applications for mergers, acquisitions, and
branch openings and closings.339
As part of the examination process, federal banking agencies
could assess lending to Black Churches as an important aspect of
regulated institutions' meeting their communities' needs.340 The
CRA is thought to have helped reduce barriers to credit in
lower- and moderate-income communities, including encouraging
small business development. 34 1 However, evaluation under the
CRA is "guided" and performance is "judged in the context of
information about the institution, its community, its competitors,
and its peers." 34 2 This standards-based approach may allow
disparate practices to continue unabated. The CRA also does not
apply to credit unions insured by the National Credit Share
Insurance Fund or non-bank entities that are supervised by the
CFBP. 34 3 Thus only a portion of the lenders that extend credit to
religious organizations are subject to the CRA's standards-based
encouragements to serve communities equally.
344
B. Extra-Legal Solutions and Implications
Semi-legal avenues and self-help may present the most
effective ways to combat lenders' behavior. Because Black
Churches primarily are small businesses, the Small Business
Administration (SBA) may provide an avenue to publicly and
nationally highlight the potential for problems with lending to
churches. The SBA already offers resources specifically tailored to
minority-owned businesses. 345 It could expand this program to
include resources specifically for Black Churches. Though this
solution is far from comprehensive, the SBA could provide one
basis to helping Black Churches better protect themselves from
lenders' potential biases.
338. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 337, at 1-2; Barr,
supra note 337, at 523-26 (discussing the purpose and provisions of the CRA).
339. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a).
340. See Barr, supra note 337, at 553-54 (discussing how the CRA may combat the
effects of statistical discrimination).
341. See id. at 561-65, 577-78 (highlighting studies that link growth in lending, home
ownership, and community investment to the CRA).
342. Id. at 597 (quoting Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations,
60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,162 (May 4, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (2016).
343. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 337, at 1-2.
344. See id.
345. See Minority-Owned Businesses, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/
content/minority-owned-businesses [https://perma.cc/55TQ-ZPSD].
11352017]
HO USTON LA WREVIEW
Ultimately, Black Churches' pastors and other leaders
becoming aware of the potential for creditors to treat their
churches differently than other similarly situated churches may
be the most effective way at present for combating the results of
those possible biases. Seriously thinking about filing under
Chapter 11, including retaining counsel, currently may be the
most effective self-help remedy for Black Churches. If lenders, on
balance, eventually will reject Black Churches' requests for
forbearances and modifications, bypassing the time and expense
of negotiating by turning to Chapter 11 overall may be less
expensive for Black Churches. 346 Black Churches do not
necessarily need to file bankruptcy to benefit. When leaders bring
in counsel, this demonstration of their savviness may be sufficient
to elevate their trustworthiness, and consensual deals may be
forthcoming. 347
Given that threatening or actually invoking bankruptcy may
be beneficial to Black Churches in a way that it is not for other
churches, education of actors in the business bankruptcy
system-attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice officials, and
judges-is crucial to ensuring that Chapter 11 is an actual safe
haven for Black Churches. 348 How actors in the bankruptcy system
handle religious organizations' Chapter 11 cases is an important
question that I intend to address in a future paper. Bankruptcy
courts are an integral part of the judicial system.349 Studying how
Black Churches are treated in Chapter 11 will further
understanding of biases in bankruptcy and how to resolve them.
Lenders also bear a responsibility to educate their employees
about the possible effects of implicit bias.350 Though lenders are
not part of the judicial system and barriers to asserting claims may
prevent them from being held accountable as a legal matter for
their actions if those actions do amount to discrimination, they
nonetheless should hold themselves accountable for how they
collectively treat their prospective clients. Churches occupy an
important place in society. Interviewed attorneys and leaders
recounted church debtors' contributions to their communities,
346. See Foohey, Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 58 (discussing rates of plan
confirmation and consensual resolution in religious organizations' Chapter 11 cases).
347. Attorneys hypothesized that involving counsel earlier might lead to
pre-bankruptcy resolutions. Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 8, at 1346.
348. See Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 424-25 (discussing educating
actors in the bankruptcy system); Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 647-49
(proposing a "lawyer's memo to self' regarding biased advice).
349. Braucher, Cohen & Lawless, supra note 18, at 425.
350. See Dickerson, Racial Steering, supra note 85, at 644 (discussing implicit racial
bias).
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including operating soup kitchens, community centers, and other
social services.35 1 Black Churches in particular also were an
important part of enhancing the image and economic opportunities
of Black communities.352 As one attorney commented, "there's a lot
worth fighting for." 353
VII. CONCLUSION
For almost a decade Black Churches have filed under Chapter
11 in numbers disparate to their incidence in the population of
congregations. Denomination, location, financial resources,
paternalism, or churches' financial decisions, literacy, views about
bankruptcy, and other governance factors do not seem to fully
explain the discrepancy. Given prior studies establishing that
Blacks pay more for consumer goods, credit, and to obtain a
discharge of their debts, it conceivable that discrimination in loan
origination and modification affects churches' use of the
bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy attorneys' and church leaders'
stories and observations of why churches, particularly Black
Churches, sought to reorganize support this theory.
Exposing race as a factor in determining if a church will turn
to Chapter 11 reveals yet another instance in which discrimination
may persist. In the absence of careful, systematic study, the fact
that racial discrimination may be occurring in this set of
transactions is far from obvious. Uncovering this possible instance
of discrimination serves as a reminder that discrimination still
may occur in many consumer and commercial contexts and largely
remains unregulated by law. But highlighting the potential for
discrimination against Black Churches in lending decisions is only
the first step toward encouraging equality in the economic and
legal systems. Having made that first step, lenders must
acknowledge the potential for bias, and further study of why Black
Churches in particular are filing Chapter 11 must be undertaken.
351. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney 115, at 7-8 (Apr. 4, 2014) (discussing a soup
kitchen); Interview with Attorney 121, at 4 (Apr. 22, 2014) (noting outreach to homeless
youth and substance abusers); Interview with Leader 55, at 6 (May 6, 2013) (discussing a
hunger program).
352. See Interview with Attorney 126, at 7 (Apr. 23, 2014).
353. Id.
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